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13 January 1984

# West Europe Report

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13 January 1984

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

### CONTENTS

#### ARMS CONTROL

##### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Schmidt on Situation After USSR Walkout in Geneva  
(Helmut Schmidt; DIE ZEIT, 2 Dec 83)..... 1

##### FINLAND

- Cruise Missiles Demand Military, Diplomatic Response  
(Editorial; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 30 Nov 83)..... 7

#### POLITICAL

##### DENMARK

- Foreign Minister Defends Reshuffling of Security Council  
(Tine Eiby Hansen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 15 Dec 83)... 9

##### FINLAND

- Paper Foresees Problems Ahead for Political Parties  
(Editorial; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 4 Dec 83)..... 10

##### FRANCE

- Communist Electoral Strategies for National Takeover  
(CONTREPOINT, No 44-45, Spring-Summer 83)..... 12

Electoral Fraud: Methods, Prevention,  
by Jean-Yves Le Gallou

Ideological Preparation for Totalitarian Takeover,  
 by Jean-Jacques Walter  
 Marxist Use of Fraud,  
 by Jacques Rougeot  
 Municipalities Under PCF Control  
 by Alain Griotteray  
 Legal Aids to Successful Fraud  
 by Roland Drago  
 Government, Public Outcry Needed  
 by Pierre Christian Taittinger

#### NORWAY

Poll on Popularity of Party Leaders Shows Gain for Brundtland (Alf Seeland; AFTENPOSTEN, 19 Dec 83).....	37
Poll Indicates Parties on Left Continuing Rise (Ottar Julsrud; AFTENPOSTEN, 17 Dec 83).....	39

#### SPAIN

Sahagun Sees Bipartisanism as Explosive Factor (Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun; DIARIO, 21 Nov 83).....	41
Demographic Study of Population Movement in Catalonia (J. Playa Maset; AVUI, 15 Nov 83).....	44
PSUC in Quest of New Relationship With PSC (AVUI, 15 Nov 83).....	48

#### SWEDEN

Security Policy Debate Increasingly Frustrating for Palme (Morten Fyhn; AFTENPOSTEN, 17 Dec 83).....	50
Activist International Role of Foreign Minister Bodstrom Examined (Olof Santesson Editorial; DAGENS NYHETER, 16 Dec 83).	53

#### MILITARY

#### DENMARK

Ellemann Appeals to SDP for Unity on Security Policy, Talks (Michael Ehrenreich; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 12 Dec 83)...	55
---	----



## DENMARK/GREENLAND

### Briefs

East Bloc Submarines in Waters	57
--------------------------------	----

## FINLAND

Paper Approves Move To Increase Refresher Training (Editorial; UUSI SUOMI, 25 Nov 83).....	58
---	----

## FRANCE

Fuller Details of 1984-1988 Defense Procurement Program (ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITES, 11 Nov 83).....	60
--	----

## NORWAY

Publisher of Anti-Military Tracts: Movement Will End Army (Thorleif Andreassen; AFTENPOSTEN, 3 Dec 83).....	65
--	----

Police Seize Documents From 'Secret Norway' Publisher (AFTENPOSTEN, 19 Nov 83).....	68
--	----

## SPAIN

Comment Urges Coherent Reconciliation of NATO, EEC Policies (ABC, 11 Dec 83).....	69
--	----

## ECONOMIC

## SPAIN

Commentary on Economic Versus Political Criteria for EEC Entry (Manuel Funes Robert; EL ALCAZAR, 9 Dec 83).....	71
---	----

Increases Registered in Jobless, Business Bankruptcies (ABC, 11 Dec 83).....	73
---	----

UGT Threatens Toughened Position on Reindustrialization (ABC, 11 Dec 83).....	75
--	----

## SWEDEN

With Election Coming in 1985, Palme Pressured on Unemployment (Bo A. Ericsson; DAGENS NYHETER, 18 Dec 83).....	77
---	----

Exports to China Almost Double From 1982 to 1983 (Bjorn Anders Olsson; DAGENS NYHETER, 14 Dec 83).....	82
---	----

## ENERGY

### DENMARK/GREENLAND

Danish-Greenlandic Resources Commission Rejects Drilling Bid (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 13 Dec 83).....	84
--	----

### FINLAND

Energy Consumption Increases Slightly Over Preceeding Year (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 4 Dec 83).....	85
--	----

## OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

### SWEDEN

Sweden To Join Antarctica Pact, Hopes To Gain Resources (Morten Fyhn; AFTENPOSTEN, 1 Dec 83).....	86
--	----

## SCHMIDT ON SITUATION AFTER USSR WALKOUT IN GENEVA

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 2 Dec 83 pp 4-5

[Article by Helmut Schmidt: "Ways Out of the Tension--East and West Must Take Advantage of the Pause for Reflection Following the Failure in Geneva"]

[Text] The decisions of the parliaments in London and Rome, and particularly in Bonn, concerning counterarming have been made. As a result there has been a certain amount of relief from Tokyo and Singapore to the capitals of West Europe and Washington. The West maintained its solidarity and capacity for political action in light of the large-scale psychological-political challenge by the Russian world power. The fact that the West did not let itself be pushed on a sloping plane inclining toward surrender of its freedom of action may have mitigated concern, albeit remote for the moment, even in the capitals of eastern and southeastern central Europe. Of course, nothing is being said about that.

At the same time, however, a number of concerns have clearly been revealed as a result of the temporary failure in Geneva and its causes, of the circumstances and feelings which accompanied the decision in the Federal Republic of Germany and of the counter-counterarming immediately announced by Andropov. This is also true of the Russians. Their hope for a decisive psychological uncoupling of West Europe--particularly of the Germans--from the United States and its leadership has not been fulfilled. Their combination of threatening, causing fear and simultaneously beckoning with understanding and readiness for cooperation has not succeeded. While Moscow's dual strategy caused added fear of U.S. missiles and U.S. policy among many people, far many more Europeans did not allow it to bar their view of realities. They know that the freedom of the individual and of whole peoples and states is threatened by the East, not by the West, and that the United States is not jeopardizing but defending this freedom of the Europeans.

Moscow's hope that the peace movements would have a favorable operative effect as far as the Soviet striving for predominance was concerned remained unfulfilled. If the Kremlin indeed relied on this hope when it rejected in the summer of 1982 the walk-in-the-woods formula which would have spared them any Pershing II missiles, this aspect of Soviet unwillingness to compromise also constituted a serious error.

The secretiveness at the top of the Soviet Union which has become a matter of course since the beginning of the Stalin era gave rise in the West to a special branch of political science--"Kremlinology." It is almost always superfluous to read its analyses and prognoses in detail. It is better to rely on Russian history--from Ivan I via Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great to Lenin, his three successors and Andropov. The internal state of Soviet leadership may be something hidden from us to a large extent. There are no unequivocal answers to immediate questions, such as: How much is Andropov handicaped by illness? How strong is he politically? Who might succeed him? What does the Politburo know about the West? How strong is the military influence on this leadership organ? What is manifest is a huge military effort which has lasted for a great many years without any noticeable break at a continual extremely high economic rate (approximately up to 12 percent of the gross national product). What is manifest is an encirclement, persecution and security complex. What is manifest is traditional Russian expansionism.

What is also manifest, however, is fear of a major war, a desire for peace with the West which gives rise to the calculating caution with which the Soviet leadership operates (individual miscalculations such as Afghanistan being the exceptions which prove the rule). What is also manifest is the ability and readiness to suffer, proven over centuries, of the Russian peoples, combined with an absolute patriotism--regardless of whether a czar or Stalin is at the top.

The tradition of the "collectors of Russian earth" has combined with the ideology of a social and political system bringing salvation this side of heaven. The West must realize that, missiles or no, this will remain so. It also must realize that it cannot change it, and that an attempt to change it through predominance might lead to extreme danger--for all concerned.

#### What Does Moscow Need To Learn?

The Soviets, however, know far less about the West than we know about the East. Whereas the fact that Khrushchev underestimated Kennedy and therefore believed he could embark on the risky Cuban-missile adventure was an exception to the fundamentally cautious expansionist tradition, the Soviet leadership after Khrushchev thought it was able to assess the United States (and the West on the whole) correctly. This was confirmed by the brutal smashing of the Prague Spring in 1968. It was confirmed by the treaties on banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, by the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), on the mutual limitation of strategic weapons (SALT) and antimissile weapons (ABM), on Berlin (Four-Power Agreement) and in the Final Act of Helsinki.

The Soviet leadership has observed the treaties it concluded but has felt unencumbered outside the spheres of the treaties. This led to the big expansion of the Soviet Navy, the SS-20 armament in Europe and Asia, the support of Vietnamese imperialism in Southeast Asia, the war in Afghanistan and the creating of footholds at the Horn of Africa, at other African locations and finally in Central America.

The Russians believe they can have four things at the same time:

1. A treaty-based strategic nuclear parity with the United States.
2. Increase in military armament outside the weapons spheres regulated by treaty.
3. Detente and cooperation in Europe.
4. Expansion outside Europe.

Since Carter assumed office the Soviets have had to realize to an increasing extent that there is something wrong with this calculation. After the astute strategy directed toward equilibrium of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger era, Carter's human rights program already appeared to them to constitute a challenge and interference. Though they themselves have always expected "ideological competition" from coexistence, they were disappointed and indignant that in the West too a president announced a counterattack in the ideological sphere. Today the Kremlin must realize that it caused an ideological countermovement in the United States which is being conducted far more radically by Reagan than was the case with his predecessor. It is finding it difficult to pin the responsibility for this on itself.

It also is finding it difficult to understand Reagan's overall strategy. If Gromyko, Arbatov and Dobrynin were to be absent at the same time, the Kremlin might not have anyone left at the upper levels who could understand or interpret the United States. There is a danger in this. The Soviet leaders understand the equations of power and counterpower. Intellectual, psychological and political processes in the U.S. television democracy, they understand and predict inadequately. It may be that, aware of the unpredictability, they think they have to prepare for the worst. Their ignorance of the free West, particularly of the United States, could be eliminated, for--in contrast with Russia's traditional xenophobia--the West is not shut off. It is downright necessary to invite the Soviets, in sizable numbers, to get to know the West.

One thing they would understand anyway: all appearances of an unsteady overall strategy of the West in the past 40 years notwithstanding, the Americans have consistently adhered to the basic line of containment--of preventing a Soviet reaching out. This they will also adhere to in the future. "The main element of any U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." This key sentence in George F. Kennan's Mr X article of 1947 will also remain valid in the future. It would serve world peace if the Kremlin took advantage of the current pause in negotiations to become fully cognizant of the basic line of U.S. strategy.

On the Soviet side there is no intention of waging war against the United States or Europe. To that extent there should be no doubt in the Soviet desire for peace at present. But the Soviet leadership must ask itself



what it itself has done wrong to cause stupid, apparently warlike speeches to be made on both sides. It must ask itself whether--and with what risk--it actually can afford to reply to followup arming with new prearming and whether it can actually surrender its overall strategy to purely military calculations--one might say, to a military security complex.

#### What Does the United States Need To Learn?

Washington is asking itself the same question. There too some speeches which it would have been better not to make have been delivered in the past few years. Much too much thought and public debate has been devoted to military hardware, and much too little to the proper overall strategy which would suit containment at present. The dropping out of foreign and security policymaking of the old Democratic and Republican East coast elite has made room for a frequently too rough demeanor which has placed old Theodore Roosevelt on his head. He said, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." Today, conversely, there is some very loud, even clamorous and--apparently--threatening, talk, while at the same time the stick is almost incessantly being criticized for being too short or too vulnerable and a bigger stick is being demanded.

This could trigger dangerous difficulties in grasping matters on the part of the Kremlin. Beyond that, however, it has triggered negative effects among the peoples of the European allies, particularly among the Germans. Part of the peace movement was generated in Washington. It is necessary that this be made clear to the Reagan administration and that it draw conclusions from it for the future. The United States and its West European allies need one another. Because this is so, no European statesman must demand developments which would infringe on U.S. protection of Europe. For the same reason, however, no U.S. leadership must neglect the interests of the Europeans.

Washington should learn the following lessons from the reaction of a lot of Europeans:

1. In European questions, one must not negotiate only bilaterally with the Soviet Union, over the heads of the Europeans. The Europeans need to feel that they are participating.
2. As a result of an almost 1,000 year old common history, the Europeans understand Russia better than is the case of Georgia or California. This European knowledge should be used.
3. The Europeans do not merely want military security; they also want detente and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The pause for reflection occurring now should lead us back to the realizations of the "three wise men." In 1956 Martino of Italy, Lange of Norway and Pearson of Canada gave the North Atlantic alliance the following advice: Americans and Europeans should consult before [*in italics*] any

decision affecting the alliance. If this procedure were to be disregarded in the future as it was in the Olympics boycott, various economic embargoes or the walk-in-the-woods, even the best overall strategy of containment in Washington could not stop the erosion of trust within the alliance, for in the long run Europe would not put up with violations against the common basic concept of the right of self-determination valid on both sides of the Atlantic.

It is necessary consciously to return to the common dual strategy which was decided on by the alliance in 1967 and has not been suspended since]] adequate political solidarity and military defense capability as well as, on that solid and secure basis, cooperation and detente with the Soviet Union. Only if there is a serious desire also for the second half of the doubtful philosophy of the Harmel doctrine is it possible to effect a strong defense policy in Europe in the long run.

#### What Can Happen Now?

Both sides, East and West, need a pause for reflection, if at all possible without any grand speeches or military gestures. When the Atlantic Council meets next week, it should in any case go on public record with the following three points:

1. It should call for continuation of the Geneva intermediate-range negotiations and at the same time express its undiminished, interest in all other disarmament talks in Vienna, Stockholm and elsewhere.
2. Regarding Western intermediate-range weapons, the West should clearly limit its 1983-84 plans for stationing them. In doing so, it need not reduce for all time the scope for stationing them originally decided on, but a present limitation is useful in order that the Soviet leadership may save face.
3. The Western side should expressly and unequivocally voice its desire to scrap intermediate-range weapons in the event of an agreement.

Then, however, early in 1984, there will be a need for intra-Western cooperation in depth in order to analyze the situation and define the overall Western strategy. The preparations for this can be made by the foreign ministers, but the heads of state and government should personally conclude the process--without pomp or propaganda.

They should then open the way to a conference of all five nuclear states. They must realize that the free world and the Soviet Union can live only if they respect one another. This makes compromises with the Soviet Union unavoidable. It also makes face-saving unavoidable. It makes cooperation unavoidable as well. A return to the double philosophy of Harmel is imperative.



The dialogue with the East must not break off. Diplomacy must at long last recover its normal stature. One must resist the temptation to misunderstand the dealings with a powerful and at the same time sensitive foreign party as an early election campaign and to lower the status of one's own foreign policy to that of handmaiden of domestic policy. Rather, one must talk discreetly with one another. Moscow will be receptive to Western ministers' readiness for dialogue.

8790

CSO: 3620/117

## CRUISE MISSILES DEMAND MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Nov 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Cruise Missiles Require New Solutions"]

[Text] Minister of Foreign Affairs Paavo Vayrynen has several times during the past few days specified some loose statements and corrected misconceptions regarding cruise missiles. Lieutenant Col Gustav Hagglund has made public the position of the Armed Forces following his example.

According to Finland's official position as expressed by Vayrynen and Hagglund the ground-to-air cruise missiles that NATO has just placed in West Europe do not present any real military threat to Finland and it is not assumed that Finland's airspace will be used for their flight.

Several foreign standpoints express the same attitude. To the views expressed in Sweden and in West Germany can also be added the recent statement made by President Juriy Andropov of the Soviet Union. He considered the Pershing-2 missiles that will be placed in West Germany a real danger for his country, while he did not have the same threatening view of the cruise missiles.

The current generation of the ground-to-air cruise missiles have to be considered less threatening also from a Finnish standpoint. In the future the other kinds of cruise missiles that are currently being developed will be a different matter. According to Vayrynen and Hagglund the military threat might come from submarines and airplanes from the Arctic Sea or the Atlantic.

According to Vayrynen, Finland is indeed getting prepared--by the end of the decade--to be able to war off, within the framework of its possibilities, cruise missiles that violate the country's airspace. According to Hagglund the radar network for ground level detection that has already been under construction for a long time will be finished within a couple of years. The network will be used also for the detection of cruise missiles.

The cruise missiles that move with the speed of a passenger plane are hard to ward off, if even possible to detect. They fly in the passes between mountains and hills and thus quickly disappear from the range of view of the radar system.

The nuclear explosive does not explode when it is dropped down during the flight, because the missile is equipped with several locking mechanisms. The nuclear explosive does not explode until it reaches its goal, because the slow cruise missile is presumably kept as long as possible within its own area, so that the enemy will not observe it.

But a country that is getting prepared to ward off cruise missiles should also remember that it is just a nuclear missile of the second order. That means that a nuclear war will already be going on, when the need arises to launch cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are too slow to be used to start a war and, on the other hand, slow enough to be dropped down by whoever fired it, if it has been fired by accident.

The problem requires a deeper analysis that we have heard so far. Parliament Vice Chairman Mikko Pesala's primitive reaction about forgetting about the Nordic nuclear free zone and hectic efforts for preparedness are not enough for an answer. It is not enough either to just refer to the obligations listed in the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance] Treaty or to say that the country should be defended in all possible ways.

The parliamentary defense committees have concluded in a recommendation that Finland should not get prepared for nuclear warfare. Our current situation does indeed seem to require new consideration of how the preparation for nuclear war could be avoided in the future. A new national defense committee should soon be appointed.

The only good total solution would anyway be that the great powers would reach an agreement in the ongoing START-negotiations in Geneva.

9662

CSO: 3617/54

## FOREIGN MINISTER DEFENDS RESHUFFLING OF SECURITY COUNCIL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Dec 83 p 9

Article by Tine Eiby Hansen: "Geographic Dispersion in the Security and Disarmament Policy Council"

Text Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen categorically rejects accusations that the replacement of several members of the Security and Disarmament Policy Council (the SNU) is politically motivated. What is behind the changes, more than anything else, is a desire to get more universities represented on the council.

That is what he said in a reply to Folketing member Steen Folke (Left Socialist Party), who finds it "rather striking" that it is precisely the elements who are critical of the government whom the foreign minister has chosen to replace. "Anyone who thinks that people are appointed to membership in the Security and Disarmament Policy Council on the basis of friendliness toward the government is making a mistake," the minister answered, and he went on to say:

"In carrying out the replacements, consideration was given to giving the council a reasonable amount of breadth. Therefore I attached importance to having people from places other than the University of Copenhagen on the council."

The fact that the foreign minister decided to eliminate representatives of the press from the council completely is owing to the fact that there had been talk in the past of "lopsided representation of the media"--a situation that is hard to straighten out since many journalists refuse to be members of political committees concurrently with their work as journalists. "I would not want to do that myself," says Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who is a former journalist. Ole Sippel, of the Single-Tax Party, AKTUEL's Ruth Northen and INFORMATION's Jorgen Dragsdahl are the ones who have to leave the council now.

"It is probably not an exaggeration to assert that Professor Bjarne Norretranders and Commissioner Henning Gottlieb are the two members of the six-member executive body of the council up to now who are the closest to the nonsocialist government's views on security policy. Interestingly enough, they are the two who are surviving the foreign minister's purge at the top of the SNU," Steen Folke says.

Lasse Budtz, the spokesman of the Social Democratic Party, also thinks that the shifts in membership indicate that a political switch is being carried out.

## PAPER FORESEES PROBLEMS AHEAD FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Dec 83

[Editorial: "The Threat of a New Deal Makes the Parties Nervous"]

[Text] Are more unstable times ahead for Finnish internal politics? The question is justified. Only two out of four large parties remain. The other two moved one step down on the scale to become middle-sized. At the same time the balance between the non-socialist and the socialist tradition seems unstable.

At the same time the outskirts of the party field are experiencing a green disorder. Although the biggest problems are solved, the voters are not able to get a grip on the parties that increasingly resemble each other. The fact that the borders are becoming diffuse emphasizes, on the other hand, the importance of the program work.

The Conservative Party, the main opposition party, is concerned. Although the other parties have in many matters reached the same strategies and the support shows record readings, the party is humiliated. The Conservative Party resembles to some extent a vessel without a rudder; the striving seems tied to a short-sighted striving for advantage.

The Center Party, on the other hand, has an advantageous placement on the political map, but this fact in itself does not guarantee that the support will continue. The party is retreating from the positions that it had during Kekkonen's era by practicing delaying action. New poer-policy strategies are creating insecurity both within the Center Party and because of the Center Party.

The party originated in rural areas but has not yet become established in densely populated areas. In the intermediate regions the party ranks seem, however, to become tighter because of external pressures. The apparent need for rejuvenating surgery seems to have paralyzed the discussion about a change of chairman.

The real joker card of the present party field is the Finnish Rural Party, which does not have any established voters' groups--yet it has outspoken

representatives and party members. The promotion to a government party has placed it on a pinnacle of the temple.

The Finnish Rural Party continues to easily take advantage of the other's mistakes, be they made in the government or in the opposition. At the same time great speeches cover up the lack of real knowledge, the necessary requirement for permanent accomplishment. The unpredictability of the Rural Party is balanced out by the steady Swedish People's Party.

While such winds are blowing within the internal politics, the Social Democrats have capable forces to throw into the new demanding positions. The state executive party cannot, however, afford to be excessively content with itself, because responsibility always brings more problems.

In the right wing the Social Democratic Party practices effective 'divide and rule' policies, while the left wing is more quiet than usual due to the 'Communists' wandering in the wilderness. In this situation the party is well able to concentrate on thoroughly thinking about issues related to the party program.

Traditionally the Communists analyze the situation in depth. Now it is affected by a split within the party by external insecurity. The separatism, however, affects the credibility. The party is declining despite the strong litigation against becoming more conservative and more like the Rural Party.

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When the motility of the voters increases and all the large parties seem to be losing their support, it is understandable that the party headquarters are getting nervous. They can, on the other hand, at all stages, rely on the reserves of new voters, on the shift of generations and the party of the sleepers, when the initial counting of the municipal elections soon is at hand.

9662

CSO: 3617/54

## COMMUNIST ELECTORAL STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL TAKEOVER

## Electoral Fraud: Methods, Prevention

Paris CONTREPOINT in French No 44-45 [Spring-Summer 83] pp 17-21

[Article by Jean-Yves Le Gallou]

[Text] Calling up the means to fight fraud probably does not consist primarily of considering the technical and legal means, but more likely consists chiefly of thinking about the psychology of those who practice fraud, and the psychology of those who fight it.

Fraud--and the fight against fraud--are phenomena that take place first in the heads of the people who are present on the spot, and the means utilized to defraud as well as to deal with fraud are secondary to the state of mind of each of the partners.

From this point of view, dealing with methods of fighting fraud is a matter first of all of their being set up by men and women who are informed as to their adversaries' mentality and determination. I am an elected representative from the minority opposition because I am a victim of electoral fraud. I attest that, on our slate, some of our friends did not believe in the objective reality of fraud, because to them it seemed enormous and impossible.

However, that's the way it is. And it is necessary to be convinced that, for the Communist rank and file, and even some of the Socialist rank and file--especially in CERES [Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research and Education]--any means of action are right, be they legal or illegal, for preserving the Marxist power bastions. The Communists' strength is that they defraud with a good conscience. For all that, I am persuaded that among themselves they do not speak of "electoral fraud," they are content to have the "class struggle" go into the voting booths.

In the face of such an attitude the first priority of the opposition must be to explain convincingly that a Marxist-Leninist must not be confused with a choir-boy. This deserves an explanation. It is extremely possible to find oneself in the polling place with people whom one knows from having met them when, like ourselves, they were taking their children to school or even, quite simply, because they live on the same floor. It is extremely possible that they are completely likeable people, with whom one can maintain excellent private



relations. But it is necessary to realize that, from the moment they enter a polling place as a member of the Communist rank and file, they will no longer recognize that kind of feeling, but they are there to bring about the triumph of a cause, by whatever means.

We should keep permanently in mind the comment of one who knows them well, Philippe Robrieux, who has written of the Communists "that they were people like other people except that they were in the service of a party that was not like other parties." This is fundamental and it is the reason why, when one finds oneself in a polling place with a Communist chairman, delegate or assessor, one needs to put aside everything connected with private relations. Every attempt to fraternize must be dismissed, because fraternization in such a case is like fraternization at the front during war: an act of treason.

Besides this priority in training and information, there is a second priority, which is to place in each polling place men and women who are as convinced and determined as their Marxist opponents. With the fundamental difference, that their will, their determination are supported, not by a revolutionary ambition but by the desire to defend democracy and law.

Their motto--inspired by that of the English--should be: "The Republic and my Law."

Starting with that, what appears to be most necessary is unarguably a project for in-depth training, doctrinal training just as much as technical training.

Training must first of all be based on understanding what Marxism-Leninism is, and what it implies concerning the mentality of those men who have decided to apply it.

Next comes the necessity for understanding that we are defending republican values, the stakes in which we must understand. The defense of democracy is not self-evident, freedom is being conquered every day.

Finally, mental and moral preparation must make it possible to resist the pressure and intimidation that will not fail to manifest themselves on election day.

This having been brought up, four kinds of conduct are necessary to fight electoral fraud:

- to be physically present at all times
- to be morally strong
- to be legally armed
- to have human support from a number of partisans.

It is indispensable to arrive at 0730 if the polls open at 0800, so as to be the first person there. If possible, it is a good idea to bring along potential reinforcements in the form of a relatively old person and a relatively young one. This means there is always at least one person who stays at right angles to the ballot box to look at the ballot section by section, no more than 50 cm from the ballot box, because as soon as one moves away, the possibilities for cheating are wide open.

This also means that someone is needed to be present--or to be in charge of the list of registered voters--just as someone is needed to prevent ballots that have been surreptitiously altered, either premarked or marked at the last minute by a municipal employee, from being smudged.

This also means that it is necessary, of course, to be present the whole time, from 0730 in the morning to 1100 at night, even longer if things are not going well. In practice, someone is also required to count the ballots when they go into the box if, "by chance," the counter breaks down. And it often does in Communist districts.

Preliminary organizing meetings are indispensable. It is necessary to meet on Friday or Saturday evening to decide on strategy or tactics for occupying the terrain in such a way that the persons present never leave their posts without having been replaced by a substitute.

It is necessary therefore to be present, physically present, and in a (slightly) "imposing" way.

There is one problem that stems from the expulsion, or evacuation by the police, of the delegates. A very simple "trick" is needed for this, which consists of not opposing the expulsion. In fact, if one agrees to leave, one can immediately appoint someone in his place. It is enough, then, to have representatives in "reserve." In addition, according to Art L 116-3 there can be no expulsion there without a legitimate reason. So an immediate complaint must be filed when anyone is thus expelled for an illegitimate reason.

In the majority of cases it may be observed that there is more intimidation or pressure than actual physical aggression.

But, in the face of pressure or intimidation the only path to follow is not to give in. This is sometimes difficult when it involves staying around for 12 to 14 hours while being subjected to continuous verbal aggression, in an ambience so hot as to be rather unpleasant.

The sole weapon against this consists of being totally convinced that one is in the right and that his battle is a just one, in order to be impermeable to the arguments and maneuvers of his adversary.

One of my assessors, in her district of Antony in the first round, in one of the polling places, spoke with the Communist chairman during a pause. The latter said to her, "I don't understand how you can be on this slate on which there are fascists, racists, etc. This is totally unacceptable." She was unable to counterattack immediately, or to get out of the conversation, and they discerned a weakness in that. That same evening, two packages of envelopes were substituted. We were just in the first round and this was not too serious, but it is a concrete demonstration of the link between moral weakness and the fraudulent operation that is consistent with it.

In this perspective it is not without usefulness to heed the lesson of the Communists. In Gentilly the other day, a poster was asserting, "Speak louder than the right." This is typical of their methods: they want to talk louder than

their opponents. Let us do the same, even if it means creating an incident.

In addition to physical presence and moral strength, it is necessary to be armed. Not armed like the henchmen of Mr Defferre in the Panier sector of Marseilles, but armed with the little red book, that is to say, the electoral code. In a pinch, the only conversation we should have with the chairman is, "Mr Chairman, I remind of Art L 65, Art R 42, which stipulates this, what you are not doing, and what I am asking you to do." Keep it up until he ends up by doing it, even if he treats you like a provocateur or fascist each time you ask him to enforce the electoral code.

It must be used repeatedly, as a bit is used to break a horse that is a little restive. And the pressure must never be relaxed, because at that moment all the "passivity" that can be adopted with respect to the code rushes into the breach.

None of the liberties they take with the code is innocent. Of course, they always pretend to say that it is for the well-being of the persons present, to simplify operations, to prevent slowdowns, etc. Voters come at the proper time to complain of the slowness of the voting operations, and you never hear that it is the right that is obstructing the voting!

Finally, one man alone can do nothing. He must have human support when his polling place starts to have the atmosphere of a revolutionary day. This is what happened last 13 March, which was not only an election day but also a multitude of revolutionary days concentrated in the polling places.

If one has with him rank-and-file members and sympathizers from the opposition, everything goes better. This is why, in districts where fraud occurs, we need support and reinforcement from the outside on the difficult days. Such support must exist not only during the day, but also in the evening when the reports are being signed. Too often, our assessors or our delegates find themselves alone against 20 or 30 persons.

In Antony, in a polling place where there have been serious incidents, with ballot boxes overturned, an added sentence was found in the report, which read, "The opposition's assessors do not challenge the honesty of Madame Chairman...", which seems most surprising, inasmuch as the chairman is being compromised. When we asked them why they had agreed to write such a statement, they replied that they had had enough, that they felt they were alone and they wanted to leave.

They no longer had any support, and after 15 hours of fighting on the ground, they were on the verge of collapse.

So those are the four rules. It is a fifth rule that picks up the whole entity and decrees that the power struggle must be established from the beginning. It is in the first half hour that one gains or loses, depending on whether he establishes a moral, legal or, possibly physical power struggle. At that moment they select their means of cheating according to a particular method. And sometimes they beat a retreat. Because, although it is hard to reduce fraud to zero, it is very possible, by establishing a proper power struggle, to reduce it to a strict minimum. To annihilate it completely would be a remarkable

feat, and I don't know whether anyone who has presided over a polling place under difficult conditions can boast of having accomplished it.

Finally, it is necessary to be completely aware that political fraud forces us to wonder about fraud in occupational elections. It is even less well known than the kind of fraud we are talking about here; however, how else can some of the CGT's [General Confederation of Labor] prodigious scores be explained? Especially when we see how free they are to cheat in political elections, despite innumerable legal controls, we begin to imagine what they are doing in occupational elections. It is enough to find that in Communist city halls, in the industrial tribunal elections, there have been many polling places where the FO [Workers Force] or CFTC [French Confederation of Christian Workers] delegate has arrived around 10 --2 hours after the polls opened--; one understands the maneuvering room left for the CGT.

There is another element. The men who are successful at cheating in political elections often are members of the CGT, and they are obviously the ones that are found in the industrial tribunal elections.

Therefore, there is a connection between business fraud, fraud in occupational elections and fraud in industrial tribunal elections.

We are facing the task of saving democracy in the elections of 1984, 1985 and 1986.

We were inadequately prepared for 1983, but at present we will not relax our vigilance and we are going to prepare for future battles, the electoral battles of the next few years.

#### Ideological Preparation for Totalitarian Takeover

Paris CONTREPOINT in French No 44-45 [Spring-Summer 83] pp 17-21

[Article by Jean-Jacques Walter]

[Text] The totalitarian machines that have been installed in a number of countries have succeeded in seizing power in two rather different ways, depending on whether the country is developed or underdeveloped.

In under-developed countries, such as Russia in 1917, China or Cuba, it was done through the medium of a civil war.

That method is scarcely usable for developed countries. Hitler must have been trying to do it in 1923 when he tried to start a bid for power; he found himself in prison.

In developed countries there is only one way to try to install a totalitarian machine, and that is to go through electoral operations. It is necessary first to take possession of the power through the vote, and then to change it gradually from the inside. Czechoslovakia was an example of this shortly after the war, with the help of the Red Army.

Nazi Germany, that is to say National Socialist Germany, set an even more convincing example, because the transformation was made, with no outside aid, by means of an electoral victory followed by abuse of power.

Electoral fraud is therefore a decisive element in a country like France: it helps collectivists obtain the victories that are necessary for their purposes.

It should be noted that installing a totalitarian system is always an old process that is suddenly accelerated. In Russia for example, no one was unaware that the Czarist regime was brutal. In the 25 years that preceded 1917 there were 232 political executions. In the 25 years that followed there were tens of millions. That is totally different. Just as in the 12 years that preceded 1933 the SA [Storm Troopers] "limited itself" to several dozen political murders while, in the 12 years after 1933, there were to be 70 million dead.

Therefore the continuities that exist--which are necessary for the process to develop--must not obscure for us the discontinuities of scale. If the Russian people had not become accustomed to the Czarist government's brutalities, if the Weimar Republic had not become accustomed to a number of methods of force and violence, the acceleration could not then have followed.

We must not be afraid to say it: we are no longer in the initial phase of the installation of a totalitarian machine in France, we are here and now at the beginning of the avalanche; the change in scale has begun.

If we look at how people in France have a mayor that the majority in their district did not want to choose, we approach a figure of 5 percent. One twentieth of the population has thus been despoiled of its electoral rights. The process hits more than 2 million persons. We are at a point where it can still be arrested, but there will surely be more of the same 2 or 3 years from now.

The decisive element in fraud is ideological.

Hitler himself observed that there is a means more powerful than terror, which is to change the mentality and the sensibility of crowds. Mao, for the same reason, effectuated an intense ideological preparation during the 3 years that preceded the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution, according to Deng Siao Ping, who certainly did not tell the whole truth, produced 20 million dead. Without ideological preparation, which transforms sensibilities, neither Mao nor Hitler could have attained the extremities of devastation of totalitarian socialism. There are two reasons for this, just as valid on the scale of socialism's terrifying violence at its end as socialism's frauds when it is being implanted.

-First, the terror must be applied by people who want to feel themselves "just." Contrary to what one might think, most torturers do not feel that they are sadists. A political movement cannot apply terror to a whole country by recruiting hundreds of thousands of strongarms unless it has explained to them that what they are doing is good. And it is through ideology that this is explained to them. Electoral fraud exists only if the rank and file has been convinced that it was necessary to practice it, and that it was justified.



-The second reason that ideological preparation is indispensable comes from the necessity of having violence or fraud accepted by the greatest part of the population. So it is necessary to spread and justify the idea that in some way violence or fraud are legitimate.

In France today we are in a situation in which the ideological preparation is much more advanced than is commonly believed. As far as what is necessary for fraud is concerned, it began in 1968, when the extremists of the left were exclaiming "election, election, a trap for c.--" [expansion unknown]--that is to say that elections are not significant--and it continued, at that same time, when many posters were put up, showing a person urinating in a ballot urn, saying "I am resorting to the urn," or, on the same level of crudeness, another that said "to vote is to piss against the wind." I leave you to imagine the drawing that illustrated such words

That very violent propaganda was intended to discredit the very principle of elections. It failed, because the French rejected it massively; the real state of mind in France was very different from what was imagined not only by the leftists but by all of the left, including Mitterrand. After the 1968 legislative elections had dotted the i's, the anti-election propaganda was resumed in different forms by the militants in the collectivist parties.

Among Trotskyites and the Communists the idea is very commonly held that election presents no legitimacy in itself. The "crowd" makes errors and is wrong, while the militants--who, of course, have reflected and been "trained"--have more right to guide the country. This thesis is very widespread today among the Communists but not yet in the country, because a majority of the French people would not acknowledge it.

Where the public at large is concerned, the attack against the principle of elections is being detoured. It begins by following Hitler's advice "to bring all enemies together in a single crowd," by grouping under the word right an amalgam that brings together at the same time genuine liberals like Margaret Thatcher or Helmut Kohl, and ordinary dictators like Pinochet. Since Pinochet's power is obviously illegitimate, the amalgam makes it possible to claim that liberals are participating in that illegitimacy, and thus that the fraud used to correct it is itself legitimate.

A second amalgam completes the plan of action: the amalgam of liberal with capitalist. The collectivists claim, despite the evidence, that no liberal is defending the idea of liberty, but only its wealth, as if all those who vote for liberty were wealthy. Moreover, this wealth, according to the collectivists, is never the result of work and the capacity to be creative in economics, but of individual privilege, as if the abundance in free countries, so superior to that in socialist countries, came only from mutual thefts. This evilly-acquired wealth would enable liberals to have at their disposal the media of press, publishing and posters, which would fool the voter by means of a publicity against which the poor man would be impotent. Under these circumstances, to cheat would merely be to make real a freedom that, without fraud would be merely a formality; if the people knew, the collectivists say, what the real situation is, they would certainly vote for the Marxists. By cheating, the latter are merely restoring to the voters the elected representatives they would have had if they had not been fooled.

It is obvious that this way of thinking comprises in itself the very negation of the elective principle. In particular, at the very heart of that principle is the idea that the voter has a right to err, that he may make a mistake in spite of all the means placed at his disposal so that he may be informed.

One part of the left denies that right. For that part, if the voter has made what they believe to be a bad choice, then the "bad choice" must be corrected.

The ideological foundation of this attack against universal suffrage is already beginning to reach broad levels of the population, which goes a long way toward explaining the leniency on the part of some courts with respect to fraud: "Yes, there has been fraud, but we should be very sure that it has changed the result" and the courts do not invalidate an obviously fraudulent election. Or even: "Some Communist or other was caught in the act of cheating, but it would be too rough to apply to him the sentence provided for by the law" and the cheater remains totally unpunished.

If the ideological attack against the principle of universal suffrage had not penetrated mentalities much deeper than has been thought, the courts would be harsher and the citizens less passive; the ideological preparation for the passage into totalitarianism is well advanced. It is the most important characteristic that brings us close to the situation of Hitler's national socialism in 1931/1932. There, too, it was acknowledged that the national socialists did not represent the actual people, but the "eternal" people, which, through the Fuhrer's voice, had the right to impose itself on the actual people.

We find that idea today, somewhat transposed, in the notion of "people of the future" which in Marxist terminology replaces Hitler's "eternal people."

Another characteristic that places us in fraud of the totalitarian type is the use of violence. Folkloric types of fraud are "soft." They consist of changing the accounts, sneaking a package of envelopes when no one is looking. This is unrelated to downright intimidation or closing the polling place to anyone who is not part of the apparatchiks. But that kind of violence occurred in the March 1983 election. Polling places were physically off limits for persons who wished to exercise their right to control. There were intrigues at that time which reveal to what depth totalitarian ideology had penetrated. Especially significant is the deliberate incompetence of some of the authorities who were charged by law with opposing fraud, when they had been warned in plenty of time.

The next stage on the road to totalitarianism--and we are already there--is government fraud, which observes the letter of the law. Legal fraud becomes possible when those who have lawfully won the power use it to pervert the electoral system. The election idea is in fact so deeply rooted in the psychology of the people that even those who totally distrust it, as in the Eastern countries, are forced to observe a pretense of it. This is how in those countries the Communist Party, which accounts for a few percent of the votes, is legally entitled to 100 percent of the candidates. The appearance is there, since there are elections, but not the reality, since there is no opposition.

Certain communist countries have adopted variations, as in Poland, where opposition parties exist, but it is the Communist Party that chooses their candidates. There again, this is legal fraud, which pretends to respect appearances but falsifies the meaning.



In France, we are reaching those shores. Hacking things up has enabled Defferre to get himself elected with a minority of the votes. This is legal fraud, in which Defferre, who was elected with 40 percent of the votes, joins Stalin, who was elected with 15 percent. The difference is one of degree, it is neither a difference in nature or in method, since the method in both cases is the writing of a law that permits a minority to win an election.

In this, Defferre is typically Stalinist. Just like Mauroy, who, although he was not elected with the help of legal fraud, at least stipulated the method. For that purpose, he annexed the Helleme district to the Lille district, with the idea that he could be a minority member in Lille. He wasn't one, but he had provided himself with the possibility of being elected in any case.

How can we fight that ideology, which serves as a foundation for fraud? One of the first projects to be undertaken is to emerge from the false symmetry mentality, which consists of dismissing both current practices and what liberals had been doing before. Because this pretended symmetry, by means of which the collectivists attempt to excuse what they are doing today, does not hold up. Some liberals, in Corsica for example, have committed rather traditional irregularities which will always remain extremely limited. The essential thing, however, is not at all that those irregularities were limited, but that they directly contravened the doctrine they defend. On the other hand, when there is fraud committed by Mauroy or Defferre, under the aegis of Mitterrand, it conforms to Marxist ideology. Moreover, we might legitimately wonder what would the socialist-communist reaction would have been if an affair like the Marseilles election had come along when the liberals were in power.

These cases of legal fraud are significant: Marseilles has a million inhabitants, who now have a mayor who was rejected by the majority of them. In the Parisian crown there are about ten cities in which, by means of violent fraud, Socialist or Communist mayors have been "elected." Well, taken all together, these cities represent "only" a few hundred thousand persons. A conclusion has to be drawn from this: legal fraud is more powerful and because of that more dangerous, than violent fraud. It is through legal fraud that the Communists and the Socialists could permanently keep the power they now hold.

There are behaviors that do not change. On 7 April 1933 Hitler caused the so-called "establishment of harmony" law: the assemblies of the Lander, that is to say the provinces whose federation constitutes Germany, were not elected, but were appointed, with the same proportion favorable to Hitler for each party as in the National Assembly. The excuse was that the multiple elections that were "tiring" the population would be avoided. This was legal, because the laws of the Weimar Republic and the operation of the institutions were officially observed in that case, just as the hacking up in Marseilles and Lille, perpetrated under Mitterrand's direction, observed the form and appearance of legality. In both cases, however, in Marseilles with Defferre, in the Lander with Hitler's henchmen, the voters had elected representatives they did not want. In both cases, too, the same Marxist ideology underlay the violation of the fundamental rule of democracy: "I learned a lot from Marxism, and I make no secret of it...All of Nazism is contained in it," Hitler said\*. "The principal theoretical contribution that inspires the socialist program is and remains Marxist," Mitterrand said\*.

\*Hermann Rauschning, Hitler told me.

\*Mitterrand's preface to the Socialist program for "changing life."

This ideology has already so impregnated our society's unconscious that Mitterrand startled no one, or almost no one, when he stated, in the second round of the municipal elections, that confidence prevailed. The ideology of the negation of universal suffrage is so advanced in people's minds that it makes it possible to calmly challenge the vote of defiance expressed by 53 percent of the voters.

Since October 1981 Mitterrand has been threatening, if his policy should fail, that he would be forced to radicalize his methods. This presentation, which was invented by Hitler, was widely used by Stalin and his successors. It claims to justify the violence exercised by the Socialist government by throwing the blame on the citizens' resistance. This is the theory of "the bitter class struggle after the power has been seized by socialism," of which the Soviets have made such good use. The failure foreseen by Mitterrand has arrived, the citizens' resistance extends throughout the country, and socialism is radicalizing its attacks against freedom, in the fields of medicine, teaching, the right to leave France, against the functioning of the economy, against information, against universal suffrage. The condition of French society does not allow it to go as fast or as far as its Communist partners can go where they have a free field, but it has openly chosen the same direction.

Between the socialism of fraud and the corrosion of freedom that is a cancer on France today, and the totalitarian socialism of the Soviets, there is as much resemblance as between a young snake and an adult snake: both are carrying the same chromosomes.

#### Marxist Use of Fraud

Paris CONTREPOINT in French No 44-45 [Spring-Summer 83] pp 29-34

[Article by Jacques Rougeot]

[Text] Something new happened in the last municipal elections of March 1983: for the first time "they" began to really talk about fraud as a real phenomenon, to be examined for itself. There are two reasons for this.

First, a number of members of the opposition were more perceptive, better mobilized, more involved than they had been during the time when they were simply the majority. They were capable of crying out, as a result of the two days of electoral experience, "Fraud exists, I saw it..." And in fact they did encounter it nearly everywhere.

The second reason stems from the enormous proportions fraud was able to assume in that last election.

The first time should make it possible to take the measure of the phenomenon and observe its specific characteristics, its nature. Some people might in fact be tempted to say--the saintly ones already do not fail to suggest it to us--that "In every way the French are a people of free-loaders," and they generally add that "we shouldn't follow Manicheism and say that there are bad guys of the left on one side and good guys of the right on the other, because fraud can go both ways, etc."

That is a very harmful attitude, even in terms of the facts.

It is enough to analyze them objectively, since the cases of downright fraud are very much localized: above all they involve Communist municipalities and, in a number of cases, Socialist municipalities.

On the other hand, we must also note the very clear difference between "free-loading" and what is properly called electoral fraud.

"Free-loading" is a practice that is basically individual and scattered. It may occur at any time and in any place. In sum, it is an unsophisticated do-it-yourself practice.

What we are examining with electoral fraud is of an entirely different nature. It even exhibits the opposite characteristics: it is programed, organized down to the smallest details, practiced collectively and systematically, with the help of everything that human ingenuity can devise in the way of methods and procedures.

We find ourselves facing the "THQ" (Highly Skilled Technicians) on the subject of electoral fraud.

Whatever may be the merits of those who are examining the mechanisms of fraud, it seems clear that nothing would be more "eloquent" than to have opposing us a good Communist militant who fashioned his theoretical and practical weapons on 6 and 13 March 1983.

In the meantime, it is necessary for fraud to be brought to the level where it should be. It is the highest authorities--in particular, the members of Parliament--who must testify to what happened, that is to say a fundamental attack against democracy. It is by this means that the population as a whole will be able to realize that fraud is not folklore, but that it puts democracy at risk.

#### Fraud and Marxism

One fear must be removed right away. Since Marxism actually explains the reasons for fraud, some of us are afraid to mention it, for fear we will be accused of having a "fixation." That risk must be taken, however, because to treat Marxism according to its own criteria is not to caricature it. In fact, many quotations from Lenin--and other theoreticians of Marxism--enjoin the people to resort to fraud, falsehood and all kinds of criminal operations whenever they feel the need.

Why is it this way? Not because the Marxists were necessarily the bad guys and we were the good guys, but because this is part of their logic, and particularly of their conception of popular elections. The very idea of respect for the will of the people, which is the basic justification for elections in the regimes we live under, is totally foreign to their minds. When they are already in power, as in the Eastern countries, elections are no more than a kind of ceremony intended to show popular approval and not to find out whether the people actually do approve.

When they are not yet entirely in power--as is the case with us--elections then constitute one of the ways to achieve power permanently. So it is necessary to become master of the system, by all available means.

The choice of methods is solely dependent on technical or opportunistic considerations, but never on considerations of political ethics. What we understand to be the meaning of the latter term is entirely foreign to the Marxist-Leninist spirit.

If we consider the coalition that governs us today, we find Communists and Socialists in it. Well, a number of French people still have in their minds the image of the good, charitable and easy-going Socialist of a number of decades ago. For all that, that image is greatly embellished. But the present Socialists are openly disciples of Marxist doctrine. This is not begging the question. One need only refer to all kinds of writings and most especially to one of the most authoritative, the preface Francois Mitterrand wrote for the 1971 Socialist program in which he wrote explicitly: "The Socialist Party's basic inspiration is and remains Marxist..." That such words are being veiled today must not cause the essential point to be lost from view; it is on its behalf that these fraudulent practices are being indulged in.

Marxism, the ongoing explanatory reason, the radical and basic reason, is also rooted in the particular situation we are in at present. We must, precisely, remember the exacerbated verbal violence we had to listen to last spring.

There again there emerges the dual temptation suggested to us by those same saintly people. On the one hand the temptation to believe that in an important election, exchanges of insults have a traditional, not to say folkloric aspect.

On the other hand, as many journalists have continually reminded us, violence is shared by both sides, and consequently everyone is responsible.

#### The Unhealthy Climate of the Municipal Elections

Here again, attentive examination of the facts attests that the reality is otherwise. It may be possible to arrange under the heading of picturesque insults the words of Jean-Pierre Chevenement mentioning "the 'fetid breath' of Jacques Chirac--after all, the former research minister does have a little Third Republic side (amusing, moreover, in someone who so much wants to appear to be in the front line of progress)--but that is actually neither the most serious nor the most characteristic.

On the other hand, it must be observed the acts of violence have been set off on the initiative of the parties in power, when they felt the wind from a cannonball go by. It should also be noted that the opposition's defamation campaign was carefully orchestrated. From all points of the political horizon we have seen emerging the same peremptory assertions, the same accusations. Uttered not by just anyone, but by friends of the president of the Republic. In such a way that one must stop and picture the Elysee occupied by a kind of Sage who was trying, from time to time, to calm the excessive zeal of the combatants.



What was said at that moment was not just "anything." It was not a matter of those simple insults which always have a slightly gratuitous character. These were in fact accusations, about anything at all; some went so far as to speak of attempted subversion on the part of the present opposition, certain members of which were called "seditious." The seriousness results from the fact that, if such accusations are taken at face value, there are not, at election time, two antagonistic conceptions benefiting a priori from the same legitimacy of principle, but one is a left that would defend the rights while its adversaries, by definition, would be suspect and probably culpable.

In the face of such persons, in the face of such dangers for the institutions, any methods are good ones. Special emphasis should be placed, in connection with the respective responsibility for the verbal violence, on the words of a minister who is considered, they say, very "soft" and very "moderate." This is Jacques Delors. That minister deplored the fact that they had "gone too far" and, in his opinion, it was the fault of the right. His argument is quite revealing. He said he believed that "by dint of talking about the government's incompetence, the right ended up by unleashing violent reactions." The act of accusing a government of incompetence--which seems to be the right and almost the minimal duty of the opposition--is no longer recognized as a right. Thus we have to face precise maneuvers, a concerted and systematic attempt to create a climate of psychological, moral and mental intimidation.

This is obviously very worrisome for the future, because these municipal elections were only considered by the government to be like local elections, with no national influence. We have to wonder what it will be like in elections that challenge the power at the head of the government.

From this situation a few very simple conclusions should be drawn for the present and for the foreseeable future.

#### Indispensable Preparation

First of all, we find ourselves confronted with the imperative necessity to organize, starting now. For this there are mobilization actions that will affect the media as widely as possible. But we must also prepare ourselves mentally. Many members of the opposition, some of them extremely committed, have only just now had a "revelation" of fraud. They did not really believe in it before. As always, it is necessary to begin with oneself, that is to say, to be persuaded of the importance and the nature of the stakes. The second aspect of the preparation is practical. All those who have participated in electoral operations have realized that a certain amount of fraud had been carried on under the eyes of those who were supposed to be there to prevent it. So good will is not enough, genuine technical preparation is needed, acquired far in advance. Our fellow citizens must learn how fraud takes place and how such practices can be prevented.

We are becoming aware then that this technical mobilization, this practical training, on the ground, is more than just physical activity. It is also a matter of influencing behaviors: those who are used to being on the "trouble spots" feel very quickly that they are armed not only against fraud, but also for all battles.

Thus it is necessary "here and now"--to use a phrase the president of the Republic would not disown and which will be my only homage to his side--for us to prepare to assume power and already to write into our various plans the very precise methods that we will set up for fighting fraud.

In fact, we must find out whether electoral fraud is profitable today for someone who practices it. What risks are run by a Communist mayor who cheats? A Socialist municipality that cheats? At the worst, whether their efforts are inadequate. That is all. It is necessary in court to prove, not only the indubitable existence of fraud, but also whether its magnitude was such that--after the event--it altered the announced result. The intellectual and moral logic should be the reverse: from the moment that fraud is recognized, even if it is impossible to prove that it was of sufficient magnitude, the elections should be nullified and new ones arranged in such a way that fraud is impossible.

It is important to take advantage of an established fact to discredit the present government. Everyone must realize that it is currently indulging in reprehensible activities. For too long the Socialists have been the object of a favorable presumption, even exceeding any imaginable reality. Even today we do not hear, among those who are the first to suffer, reflections of this kind: "Yes, their intentions are good, but the tree is not producing fruit as juicy as one might hope."

We have to get people to acknowledge that their intentions are absolutely not pure and that they are even showing, wherever they can, a determination and a cynicism that must be denounced at every opportunity.

For a long time we have participated in a state of torpor, believing that we were not being directly threatened and that the incidents of fraud that were occurring were merely "unfortunate mistakes" that could not cause us to lose our freedom. The state of mind is now changing, and we have to reckon with that decisive element. The population was formerly unaware of a reality that nonetheless already existed. This is a constant phenomenon; there must be time between the deeds and the awareness they arouse.

We understand better today that our Marxist adversaries have always been professionals at politics, considered in its pure essence, that is to say seizing and holding onto power.

On our side, there were only amateurs and do-it-yourselfers. It is thus very possible to complain bitterly about the preceding government, which did not know how, or did not wish to do this or that, but it is even more important, as of now, to take the present situation into account in order to support the awakening consciousness of our friends.

There is still time for all that, for such mobilization and preparation operations, but there is just enough time. We are in fact in the presence of an avalanche phenomenon that has no chance of slowing down on its own. It is one of those "totalitarian machines" whose movement can only increase and accelerate. At a certain stage in the mechanism, even if it is regarded as excessive, it is necessary to be able to assume our responsibilities and denounce the danger for democracy. This is the price of democracy's survival.

## Municipalities Under PCF Control

Paris CONTREPOINT in French No 44-45 [Spring-Summer 83] pp 35-38

[Article by Alain Griotteray]

[Text] In truth the retreat, if not electoral debacle, of the left was written into the remarkable figures obtained in 1977 in the municipal elections and in 1981 in the presidential and legislative elections.

In 1981 in the June elections, the left had fewer votes than in 1978. Its higher percentage of the votes is easily explained by the rise in the number of abstentions among Republican voters. The June 1981 success was nothing more than an electoral souffle whose air space was those on the left who abstained. But everyone knows that when you puncture an air space, the souffle falls. In the same way, the surprising increase in the Communist Party in 1977 was explained by the leftist coalition strategy that gave it many cities. Some of them, moreover, appeared to be genuine gifts from the Socialist Party--Rheims, for example.

But that Socialist thrust and that Communist thrust occurred at an inopportune moment in world evolution and French evolution.

Electoral results in Northern Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world are on the whole in agreement. In Great Britain, in the United States, in Scandinavia, in West Germany, in Austria, in the Netherlands and in Belgium, the elections that took place during the last 5 years show a liberal thrust and a shrinking socialist vote.

This is explained by the increasingly patent failure of that ideology. Even in its most moderate form, the welfare state is going through a crisis: a financial crisis, because its indeterminate expansion is wrecking the engine of growth and emerging into economic stagnation; a fiscal crisis, because the taxes needed to finance social services are hitting more and more citizens; a bureaucratic crisis because increased regulations are emerging into control over all economic and social activities, which is contrary to the French people's aspirations toward freedom. It should be added that the Socialist Parousia [Second Coming] seems to be farther and farther away, because the sectors that were most influenced by egalitarian ideology, justice and education, are also the ones that are going through the most profound crisis.

To top it all off, so to speak, the historic and sociological foundations of socialism are also being directly threatened. Tied to the mass production system, to the importance of the machine and labor on materials, the proletariat concept daily masks less and less well the economic reality; as for the rural exodus that uprooted the populations and sent them to the cities, which enabled the Communist Party to settle into large soulless groups and the Socialist Party to win over the housing developments in the large suburbs, it came to an end toward 1975. Today we are witnessing an urban exodus in the direction of the villages and the countryside, and a gradual resettling in the city centers. "Screams" from the shifted populations, according to Durkheim, and socialism thus loses one of its reasons for being.



Marxist theoreticians as reliable as Jean Poperen and Lionel Jospin were not mistaken about it; they are constantly diagnosing "the sinking of socialism's social bases." And as logical Marxists they certainly feel that the verdict is in danger of being without an appeal. They shriek like white-tailed eagles, but their cries poorly mask their disarray.

In fact, it is the Communist Party more than the Socialist Party that is in the lead, all the more so because it is discredited by the Soviet Gulag, Afghanistan, and Poland, and especially because it no longer has a credible model to offer. Those weaknesses existed, of course, in 1977 and 1981, but they were not yet appearing in a context of opposition to a government battling with the difficulties of the international crisis. After 1981 the accumulation of all the cultural, local, trade union and national powers acted as an indicator. Socialism, placed under the searchlights of the media, very quickly began to look like a wrinkled old woman. Six months after its arrival at the Elysee and the Bourbon Palace, its side declined in the polls and the party in power flew into failure after failure, from by-elections to local elections.

### The Rejection of Alternation

But, although we explain satisfactorily the electoral retreat of the left, for all that, we do not understand its engaging in fraud. There is no more classic example of teams in power that are sanctioned by public opinion. Many conclusions can be drawn from it: appeal to the popular verdict through new elections, throw down the gauntlet, or else change course or even prepare to agree to the game of alternation when the national elections come along, or even--why not?--be challenged again. Why did the Socialists not find, like Alain Touraine, a man of the left though he was, that "socialism's time is over"? And the sociologist added, "It is high time socialism became aware and lived in its times, that it thought and acted according to new situations and new kinds of conducts in the midst of which we are acting and over which, like sleepwalkers, tread the abusive heirs to past battles and theories." But of that, there is no question. An ideological apparatus is not challenged, because it is an important system in the service of a Utopia. And then, a Utopian ideologue cannot be mistaken: it is the facts that are wrong or the adversaries that are wicked. The doctrine absolutely cannot be bad. As for the political official, the machine man, what could be more natural than to see him hanging onto his job? There is hardly an alternative solution.

In Marseilles, behind Gaston Defferre, there is a group of networks that want to survive, whatever the cost! In Creteil, what does it matter to Michel Guillou, the opposition candidate, if he loses? He will still be a university professor; his Socialist opponent, Laurent Cathala, will again become a stretcher-bearer, even though he is at the same time a professional unionist. As for Trappes, the act of being elected mayor will not radically change the life of Mme Cayet, but if her opponent, Hugo, is beaten he is also in danger of losing his job as Communist Party official, which he has occupied for a very long time.

It is important to thoroughly understand the major difference between the "right" and the "left." On the left, tens of thousands, indeed hundreds of thousands of men are living on politics and trade unionism. This is not the case with the Republicans and this explains, but does not excuse the fact that the former cannot conceive of alternation in a democratic fashion.

In fact, neither Socialists nor Communists want alternation.

The Communists' attitude is well known. In the countries of the East, it is an "electoral victory--fixed, moreover--which enables them to grab Poland and Czechoslovakia. Since there were no free elections, nor any possibility of change. In France we are not wondering enough about the absence of alternation in Communist districts. Everyone acknowledges the inevitability of a district being able to become Communist, and that from the day that happens, it never stops being a Communist district. They are "good managers," said the most naive! Was Acheres really won back in 1971? But it became Communist again in 1977. The parenthesis was closed, the absence of true alternation confirmed. It was also that principle that was invoked by a chairman of the Communist General Council before the Commissioner of the Republic for his department who informed him of his astonishment over the methods used last 6 and 13 March. The answer he received was something like this: "We can't accept losing popular municipalities on a sudden impulse on the part of the voters."

As for the Socialists, their attitude vis-a-vis alternation is more subtle. A district can become Socialist and stop being Socialist, on the condition that it is not Marseilles or Draguignan or Alfortville. As for alternation in the National Assembly, men like Louis Mermaz do not rule it out, as long as it works, in their own words, "within the forces of progress," that is to say, among the governmental majority groups, and even among the Socialist Party groups. And how could Socialists accept the natural alternation when we see the government's spokesman, Max Gallo, characterize the opposition between the left and the right as opposition between good and evil? In the name of what, really, would the forces for good gracefully agree to yield the government to the forces of evil?

That would be a crime!

From there on, electoral failure cannot be accepted. If the left had experienced too massive a failure in the municipal elections, the government would have had to change its policy, and if, in the left, the Communist retreat had been even stronger, it would have been especially difficult for Georges Marchais to defend keeping his party in the government. For the political stability of the governmental majority, it was of cardinal importance that Georges Marchais be able to inform the Central Committee of "the good electoral results for the PCF" and, from there on, it became legitimate to save anything--if only to keep up appearances.

Let us imagine for a moment that on the evening of 13 March, we won Marseilles--since that would have been the case without the fraud, "legal" and illegal, committed by the interior minister--and that, without open fraud being committed by the Communist Party, we had won in eight or nine additional large cities; what an impact it would have had! On that evening the eight largest cities in France would have been Republican opposition cities, and our gain in cities of over 30,000 population would not have been 31, but 40. That would have been different, and it would then have been very difficult for the media to present it as a quasi-victory for the Socialists. The president of the Republic would not have had the impudence--at least we hope he would not--to talk about "recovered confidence" in the second round. That was already incorrect with respect to the results that we know; it would have appeared grotesque without the fraud.

That is why the shock of the Socialist decline and the Communist withdrawal, joined with the rejection of natural alternation causes a step to be taken toward radicalization.

No one should have any illusions about that.

The Socialists saw that legal fraud "paid off" in Marseilles. They will therefore broaden a new general law for the legislative elections. The Communists found that violent fraud made it possible to limit the damages, so they are perfecting their methods still more.

Fraud must not be excluded from the, theoretically, less important elections-- I mean the European elections. If it enables the coalition in power to win one or two percentage points, in the present situation that is enormous. Psychologically, it will be worth a fortune.

Against that we, the Republicans, must fight. Once more we must save democracy.

#### Legal Aids to Successful Fraud

Paris CONTREPOINT in French No 44-45 [Spring-Summer 83] pp 39-43

[Article by Roland Drago]

[Text] Although no one doubts the importance of having solid legal arguments with which to fight electoral fraud, the jurist who attacks this problem often feels that he is armed with a wooden sword. Fraud, to be precise, is negation of the law practiced in so presumptuous a way that it often seems impossible for the rules to be observed.

Electoral legislation fails to favor another sentiment. In fact, when one skims over it, one is taken by the otherworldliness of the sentiment: everything rests on the good faith of bureau presidents, municipal authorities, voters, etc.

This legislation is also dominated by its archaism, because it should not be forgotten that most of the provisions of the electoral code date from at least a century ago, while fraud has taken on a very new look in the last few years.

It has no doubt been quite a long time since people began to realize that fraud had become systematic, especially on the part of the Communist Party, who were preparing for it and setting it up, but it had never been possible to realize it so obviously as in the last municipal elections.

Despite this legislation's otherworldliness and archaism, an important reform should be mentioned, whose existence must be emphasized: the reform that established the law of 31 December 1975. That law endeavored to remedy a number of defects that were patently obvious up to that time. In particular, it gave the courts a number of means that they had not had before.

But, because it is a recent law, the courts are neither used to nor experienced in systematically enforcing it. In the sentences that will be passed for the affairs of the 1983 municipal elections, we will see precisely whether the courts know how to utilize the new weapons they have been given.

## Rules of Procedure

In a case of fraud, it is always the administrative court that is referred to. It is the only court with jurisdiction. This poses a problem, moreover, because it is not evident that it has the capacity to try this type of litigation. Of course, penal matters, such as defamation, continue to be the concern of the repressive jurisdictions.

The administrative court is referred to, by a candidate or a voter, within 5 days after the election. The time period is thus very short. The court may also be referred to by an injunction (deferred?) imposed by the prefect. At one time this procedure was common because there was, at that time, a certain code of ethics pertaining to the prefectural office.

The administrative court then has 2 months to come to a decision, 3 months if a new general election is involved. That is to say that it is confined to a lapse of time that must be thoroughly understood in terms of what it represents: the administrative courts are extraordinarily cluttered and they have a backlog of 75,000 matters to handle. It is estimated, in general, that it takes 3 years for a case to be heard by the administrative court. However, the 3-month interval still seems to us too long, because it is when it is "hot" that a matter should be interpreted. Let us add to this another procedural archaism: normally, appeal before the Council of State of a decision rendered by an administrative court has no suspensive effect, that is to say that the decision must be compulsorily enforced. This means that from the moment his election is invalidated, a mayor should no longer be able to exercise his mandate, even though he appeals this measure to the Council of State. In the electoral litigations it does not work that way: the appeal has a suspensive effect, or, more exactly, as stipulated in Art L-250, "The elected candidate remains in office even though his election has been nullified, until he has been given a definite ruling on the litigation."

This is quite shocking. From the point of view of administrative ethics, this attitude is entirely reprehensible, since it permits the perpetrator of fraud to remain in office.

As for the Council of State, it is given no specific time within which it must come to a decision. The code simply stipulates that it must reach a decision "according to urgent procedure." Since it is itself cluttered, and has a backlog of 15,000 cases, it could take 3 years to reach a decision. It can also take less. In the matter of Fontenay-sous-Bois--the contested elections dated from 1980--the decision was handed down in 1982. It should be thoroughly understood that there may be delaying tactics on the part of the defrauded [as published], such as, quite simply, a succession of expert witnesses who hold up the proceedings.

Consequently, from the moment the election is finally invalidated, much time has gone by during which the "wrongly elected" representatives remained in place. They have had time to strengthen their positions and time for the fraud they committed to be forgotten.

There again the 1975 law did not provide for correcting all the abuses and all the defects of the system. In the days to come we will have to think about those lacks.



There is another defect to which we will have to react, which concerns the powers of the administrative courts. In fact, the electoral code, except for secondary points, does not clearly outline the courts' powers in this area. This makes it necessary to go back to the law to establish the new powers, in terms of the new varieties of fraud. This explains the interval that exists between the time a new kind of fraud makes its appearance and the time when it is heard by the courts.

However, we are certainly in the presence of a number of situations whose major characteristics must be defined.

In the most typical hypotheses the court, purely by means of jurisprudence because it has no law on this point, has assumed the right to nullify the announcement of the results. In certain circumstances it believes that the announcement was made under illegal conditions, either in the law itself or because of previous fraud. In this hypothesis, which, alas, is used only very rarely, the court takes the place of the polling place. When necessary, it reverses the result of the voting and declares that candidate elected who, in its opinion, should have been elected.

This is what it did in the elections in Aix-en-Provence in 1967, and in 1972 in Fontenay-sous-Bois.

If we take the trouble to read the Council of State's judgment, rendered on appeal with respect to the Fontenay elections, we note that it actually penalizes the inadmissible conduct of the Communist candidate. But this is exceptional, and it would be desirable for the judges in such cases to make much broader use of this right to announce instead of and on behalf of election authorities, nullifying, not the election--which forces everything to start all over again--, but the announcement, which merely reestablishes the legal status.

All the more so because, in the above case, the suspensive appeal operated in favor of the decision handed down, and thus in favor of the announced winning candidate.

We have in this case an example of a jurisprudential standard that is well adapted and whose sole defect is that it is too seldom utilized. Between 1980 and 1982 we find only four decisions of this type. It is not impossible that the recent abuses in the last municipal elections are changing this figure.

In the other cases, when the administrative courts find "normal" errors, they proceed to nullify the election.

Such nullification involves inconveniences, besides the fact that the appeal makes it possible for the perpetrator of the fraud to remain in place, depending on the criteria on which the judge bases his decision. On the one hand there is irregularity in the way the voting is conducted--and we know it is difficult to demonstrate because of the otherworldliness of the electoral code--and on the other hand there are maneuvers on the part of the candidates. On this last point, everything depends on the judge's interpretation after a due hearing.



The Council of State has always believed it should only nullify if the discrepancy in the votes is small. Even though the law seems to acknowledge today that this discrepancy need not be absurd--as was the case in 1982 in Fontenay--, that decision remains a specific case. When there is a significant discrepancy the fraud is considered to have no effect. The same is true of maneuvers.

In the latter case, and this is quite laughable, the Council of State happens to be content with a moral judgment. This is why we find in decisions such phrases as "As questionable as this practice is...it has had no effect on voting." We must fight this kind of jurisprudence, first for moral reasons--fraud is fraud, regardless of its effect on the vote--and next because nullification has exemplary value. Finally, we must fight this kind of jurisprudence because we know that fraud can, as it did in Marseilles, concern hundreds of votes.

What, then, did the 1975 law contribute?

On two points, it inaugurated two useful reforms that we should like to see used more often.

Principal among them are those that result from Art L 250-1 of the electoral code: "the administrative court may, in a case of nullification of an election for maneuvers in establishing an electoral slate or of irregularity in conducting the voting, decide--notwithstanding any appeal--to suspend the mandate of the person or persons whose election has been nullified."

This formula, which is an especially satisfactory one, would make it possible to avoid the inconvenience of the long time period, which we pointed out above. If the court had the courage to enforce Art 250-1, it would suspend the mandate of those people whose election was nullified and would install a special delegation. This would be a considerable sanction, but I know of no example of its use.

The second method results from Art 118-1 of the electoral code: "The administrative jurisdiction, in declaring an election invalid because of fraud, may decide that supervision over one or more polling places will be provided by a person appointed by the presiding judge of the high court, in the by-election following that nullification."

Here again, enforcement of this article would make it possible to restrict the exorbitant prerogatives of outgoing fraudulent municipalities, which can install their own law in polling places through the discretionary choice of supervisors that they are permitted to exert.

When we look at administrative jurisprudence we realize that judges, in most cases, except for strokes of luck, are really materially unable to verify all the elements of voting. In fact, although maneuvers patently exist, and so may be placed under sanction by the judge, irregularities affecting the ballot are virtually undetectable by a judge who intervenes 2 or 3 months after the voting. The polling place reports have been burned and the polling place supervisors, or the mayors, have had time to alter the documents.

This is how the problem of signatures leads to inextricable abuse. Normally, the signing must be done "with a pen." Will a ballpoint pen do?

As for vote-counting operations, there is a series of provisions that merely give the appearance of being observed. It is said that the urn should have only one opening, but if the urns have slits through ballots can be slipped, it cannot be proved.

Nor is the "kangaroo envelope" system detectable. Similarly, the system of signing with a simple x also makes all kinds of fraud possible. Whereas it should be the voters themselves who sign the signature sheet, as occurs in university elections, which, however, are not models of legality, far from it.

Finally, centralizing the reports from the principal polling place gives rise to a whole series of manipulations. Have we not often seen the mayor closeted alone in his office, which is nevertheless prohibited? When a supervisor closets himself in a place that is not public, fraud should be considered.

It seems difficult not to note the considerable power of those who supervise the polling places. It is so great that a reform of the electoral code is mandatory as far as their appointment is concerned. Until now this has been a prerogative of the mayor, which makes it easy for outgoing mayors to cheat. An electoral code reform that would lead to more guarantees for democracy appears to be imperative.

However, the powers of the supervisor are not completely limitless. The delegate may be a real counterweight. Thus, Art L-67 provides that any candidate or his duly appointed representative has the right to control all voting operations: counting the ballots and the votes are under his control in all places where such operations are taking place.

On the other hand, Art R-50 stipulates that a "demand made by the supervisor of the polling place may not have as its object preventing candidates or their delegates from exercising control over electoral operations or any prerogative provided for by the laws and regulations." Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten what this means, but outside of those two articles we have no other assets.

Thus, there are many disadvantages to the present electoral system. The code is made up of bits and pieces, one part of it goes back to the 1852 plebiscite elections, which were certainly particularly honest elections. Then there was the 1884 reform, followed by other touch-ups. It is a Harlequin's coat with little consistency, even though the 1975 law made every effort to make it easier to use.

This is why we must formulate useful proposals so that elections may become what they ought to be in reality: incontestable tools of democracy.

#### Government, Public Outcry Needed

Paris CONTREPOINT in French No 44-45 [Spring-Summer 83] pp 45-47

[Article by Pierre Christian Taittinger]

[Text] One important observation is vital: the time to talk about fraud has come. Too often delayed or neglected, discussion now seemed to be necessary.

The problem of fraud needed to be raised clearly and candidly, quite simply because it represents a challenge--and a very grave danger--to democracy.

Democracy, we all feel, is a fragile asset. It is based upon the acceptance of rules that are fixed and recognized by the majority of the French people. It rests on the indispensable consensus of the citizens, and above all on freedom and respect for the choices of those citizens.

The example of those Frenchmen who go, because they are public-spirited, to deposit their ballots and will never know whether their ballot has disappeared or been distorted in the vote-counting, is extraordinarily vivid.

How many unknown Frenchmen are today being injured by universal suffrage?

Democracy rests on a power that is never talked about enough, the power of suffrage. That is what gives it legality and dimension.

What is dangerous in this kind of fraud is the fact that the people's decision is held up to ridicule, the political and ethical contract that makes the citizen one with the state is perverted.

But the power of suffrage has only been reinforced in these last few years: the election of the head of state by universal suffrage gave it a still greater dimension. Universal suffrage today should not be defended by speeches--as eloquent as they are--but by deeds. Fighting fraud is one of those deeds.

In approaching this theme no one ever intended to conceal its limitations. Up to now, this was a taboo subject. The Third, Fourth and Fifth Republics never approached the problem in its entirety, because it was hard to consider a delicate question while our national equilibrium was in danger of being threatened.

There was a certain consensus in this country for admitting--and the law is stable on this point--that electoral fraud was a reality, but that it was dangerous to handle it globally, that precise, and limited cases should simply be examined. At election time people were striving to settle existing disputes with great prudence by hiding behind a double directrix: fraud is first an exception and then, it should be examined only if the discrepancy in the votes between the candidates is minimal. It will be noted that this was a singularly restrictive condition applied to the subject.

It was necessary to stand up for going against archaism and otherworldliness.

But raising the problem is not solving it, but it does make a contribution to eliminating one of the most shocking aspects of French politics.

It would be proper to establish a parallel between electoral fraud and fiscal fraud. The latter causes indignation and general censure. It appears in all denunciations of politicians, to the point where all Frenchmen are a priori suspected of being tax cheaters. People even manage, by cleverly calculating probability, to quantify its importance and still remain angry. What is always necessary to do is to be aware of a problem's importance.

The authorities could have the same determination with respect to electoral fraud, and this would ultimately convince the entire population.

As for the very existence of fraud, there are too many detailed examples for any doubt to remain.

Fraud therefore attacks, under our very eyes, the foundations of democracy, by trying to bend the popular will. As of this moment, faced with the peril, it is no longer possible to keep silent.

A policeman said he believed there was perfect crime when no one could even suspect that a crime existed. It is the same for fraud. In a number of cities in France there is a perfect fraud because it is impossible to suspect that it exists there. Moreover, this is a very serious phenomenon, that should be underlined, because when the discrepancy is narrow one often hears it said that "there was fraud," while such a presumption is no longer made if the difference is one of 5,000 votes.

That is one of the many effects of otherworldliness and archaism, that we should never grow tired of denouncing, on the part of those whose mission it is to put the law into words.

But there is undoubtedly something more serious today. If someone has known--and recognized earlier--regional, picturesque fraud, as in Corsica (urns disappearing into the sea, the mayor fleeing into hiding with the urn), all of this would merely produce a smile and the certainty that "that couldn't happen here."

Well, it has also happened here. We have had, right under our eyes, a number of cases of fraud that we were unable to detect or prevent, and whose consequences we had to support.

Our intervention must not be excessive (like that of the finance minister with respect to fiscal fraud), but it is permissible, by systematic research, to demonstrate both the depth and the intensity of fraudulent maneuvers.

One of this dossier's contributions is that it was able to show that there have been two moments that were propitious for fraud. The first is when the electoral list is established, the second when the votes are counted.

In the latter case a certain formalism in the law, the gaps and inadequacies in regulating it have contributed to encouraging these actions. Becoming aware of these gaps should result not only in a single bill, but also in a group of bills dealing with these very precise points. For it is no longer possible to let certain deeds go without reacting; the opposition is prepared to wage this battle and it would be revealing to see the present majority reject such texts, if we can put them on the legal plane, on a plane of honesty and a certain conception of ethics.

"The ballot will always remain stronger than the bullet, as long as its value has meaning," a former American president believed. Today democracy should be

able to defend itself on equal terms against fraud and those who practice it.  
This will be the price of guaranteeing that each citizen has genuine rights.

It is fitting, therefore, for all democrats in this country to react with the  
calmness, faith and certitude that the defense of a just cause exudes.

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CSO: 3519/138



## POLL ON POPULARITY OF PARTY LEADERS SHOWS GAIN FOR BRUNDTLAND

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by Alf Seeland]

[Text] Gro Harlem Brundtland has clearly passed Jo Benkow on the party leader popularity curve in recent months. Some 64 percent of those asked feel that she is doing a good job, while the figure is 52 percent for Benkow. The month before the fall election, the Conservative leader was at 68 percent, while his chief opponent had 57 percent. The chairman of the Christian People's Party, Kjell Magne Bondevik, had 69 percent and Center Party chairman Johan J. Jakobsen had 65 percent. But those with the highest rating were Hanna Kvanmo of SV [Socialist Left] and Progressive Carl I. Hagen, both with 76 percent. Liberal Odd Einar Dorum came in last with 41 percent.

The opinion poll that the Norwegian Opinion Institute conducted for AFTENPOSTEN in November also showed substantial changes in how party leaders were rated by members of their own parties. Benkow has declined from 90 to 76 percent among Conservative voters, while Gro Harlem Brundtland had a stable rating of 85 percent from her party. Bondevik and Jakobsen got 96 and 87 percent respectively from their own party members. Simple speeches and behavior seem to be most popular just now: Hanna Kvanmo got a full measure of 100 percent SV applause while Hagen's voters paid a 99 percent tribute to the party leader. In a laconic comment, NOI [Norwegian Opinion Institute] speculated that the last election campaign had influenced the changes that were noted.

The most striking feature in the background material for the poll is that there does not seem to be much geographic difference in the views about Hagen. In the country's thinly-populated districts, 73 percent feel he is doing a good job, in Trondelag and North Norway the figure is 76 percent. In the municipal and county elections, these were the party's weakest areas, after FRP [Progressive Party] isolated itself from all other parties on district policy. The equalization that is now being noted leads one to ask if the party will establish itself on a national basis. But Hagen still has more male than female admirers.

Despite general agreement that Jo Benkow was a "hard worker" for the party in the election campaign, the decline he registered was evenly distributed over the entire country. In rural areas he is now esteemed by only 45 percent, compared to 61 in his own environment--Oslo/Akershus. In all, 38 percent said the Conservative leader was doing a poor job for his party, a figure surpassed only by Odd Einar Dorum with 39 percent. As many as 42 percent of Progressive Party voters turned thumbs down on Benkow, who has been subject to discussion since the election on his double job as party chairman and parliamentary leader.

Gro Harlem Brundtland's stronger position is due partly to the fact that she has more status among her own voters, but it is mainly due to the fact that a sizable minority of voters for other parties respect the work she is doing. This is pointed up by the fact that as many as 40 percent of Conservative voters think she is doing a good job. In relation to where she started out she also has a higher rating among union people in LO [Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions]: 78 percent approve of her while 18 percent gave her a poor rating. But here too Hanna Kvanmo was ahead with an approval rating of 83 percent.

The solid positions of Bondevik and Jakobsen do not indicate that their parties' 6-percent level in the last opinion poll are due to discontent with the leadership. On the contrary, there are many indications that cabinet posts have made it possible for them to maximize their personal standing without this having given their parties a similar advantage. In the southern and western parts of the country, Bondevik got 77 percent, while Jakobsen registered 70 percent in the rural districts. But the communications minister could note a 34-percent opposition in Trondelag and North Norway.

Liberal chairman Dorum's poor showing in all parts of the country and in all environments is probably due partly to the fact that he is not in Storting with the possibilities this provides to gain attention. But the party's parliamentary leader, Hans Hammond Rossbach, did not get much more support when he took part in the survey in August. What is probably more important here is the Liberal Party's difficulty in defining its place in Norwegian politics and the fact that voters to an increasing extent are finding reason to doubt if the Liberals are nonsocialists. And socialist policy is best pursued by the avowed socialist parties.

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## POLL INDICATES PARTIES ON LEFT CONTINUING RISE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Dec 83 p 10

[Article by Ottar Julsrud]

[Excerpt] The tendency in the September election is gaining strength. In the November poll from Norwegian Market Data, the Labor Party and the Progressive Party made new gains--continuing a trend throughout the fall--while the nonsocialist coalition parties registered steadily declining support. The distance between the coalition parties and the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party is now around 7 percent.

For the first time in over a year, the Labor Party was back in the 40th percentile in the Market Data poll, after a gain of 1.3 percent since October. This confirms the rising tendency since the summer. Or, as they say, the party is "on the move." And the Conservatives had to note a confirmation of their declining tendency once again, with the party now having fallen to 26.1 percent.

The Progressive Party is once more in November the nation's third largest party, a position it captured the month before. FRP [Progressive Party] had a support level of 9.3 percent. Thus the biggest of the government parties continues to lose voters to Carl I. Hagen's party. The Christian People's Party emerged with a slight reduction, but not so much as to weaken the impression that the party has stabilized around 8 percent. The Center Party, on the other hand, continued the fall's declining curve and now lies at 5.4 percent, the lowest it has ever registered in this poll.

The Liberals came out with 3.6 percent, which is a shade lower than its average in recent months, while the results for the Socialist Left Party confirmed a slight increase.

The Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party got total support of 39.2 percent in November. The socialist side achieved 47.5. If the Liberals are included on that side, the result is more than 50 percent. This month's figures will hardly defuse the debate on nonsocialist election coalitions in 1985. The poll was taken in a period when Storting was coming down the home stretch in the debate of next year's

national budget. The missile issue also drew a lot of political attention-- although it did not seem to have any special effect on the November poll released by Norwegian Market Data.

Table: Political Barometer

<u>Party</u>	<u>Sep</u> <u>1981*</u>	<u>Sep</u> <u>1983**</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>1982</u>	<u>Mar-</u> <u>Apr</u> <u>1983</u>	<u>Oct</u> <u>1983</u>	<u>Nov</u> <u>1983</u>
Red Electoral Alliance	0.7%	1.2%	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.9%
Labor Party	37.1	39.2	39.9	37.4	39.2	40.5
Norwegian Communist Party	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3
Socialist Left Party	5.0	5.3	5.1	5.2	5.8	5.8
	43.1	46.1	45.8	43.5	45.9	47.5
Progressive Party	4.5	6.3	6.0	6.6	8.3	9.3
Liberal People's Party	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.3
Conservative Party	31.8	26.2	29.3	31.4	26.8	26.1
Christian People's Party	9.3	8.7	8.5	7.0	8.1	7.7
Center Party	6.6	7.3	5.7	6.7	6.2	5.4
Liberal Party	3.9	4.4	4.1	3.9	4.0	3.6
Others	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1	
Number stating party preference		1099	1136	1132	1163	
Total number interviewed		1298	1334	1376	1359	

\*Storting election

\*\*County elections

The barometer is produced by weighing each party against the 1981 Storting election. The estimated statistical margin of error is 3 percent for voter shares of around 50 percent, about 2 percent for shares of 10-20 percent and close to 1 percent for lower voter shares.

The interviews were conducted in the period from 17 November to 7 December.

Oslo, 16 December 1983, Norwegian Market Data, Inc.

6578

CSO: 3639/46

## SAHAGUN SEES BIPARTISANISM AS EXPLOSIVE FACTOR

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 21 Nov 83 p 2

[Article by Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun]

[Text] The author of the article sharply criticizes the bipartisanism in which Spanish politics operates, in line with the latest events in parliament, and reminds us that the several parliamentary minorities have received the confidence of 4 million voters. The scheme of bipartisanism which it would impose brings with it a permanent risk of radicalization.

Some of the events of the last few days--in and out of the recent parliamentary session--should serve as an element of sober reflection for those who apparently insist in trying to force a bipartisan arrangement, which not only does not correspond to the pluralistic reality of our society, but which inevitably leads to a bipolarized Spain, that is, divided into two large blocks of Right and Left, which contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of the citizens, would end up sooner or later confronting each other.

In the difficult years of transition, the existence of a reformist political policy with a strategy of moderation, counted on the backing of an important part of the population and constituted, without doubt a fundamental element of equilibrium in the process of change.

It not only permitted the moderation of attitudes, the establishment of avenues for social dialogue and the avoidance of useless confrontations in difficult economic times, but thanks to the understanding attained, important reforms which appeared impossible a few years ago were achieved and which depended, without doubt, on a substantial advance in the modernization of our country and in the configuration of an authentic society of liberties, as a mark of the peaceful coexistence of all Spaniards.

It is certain that there were errors in the process, and above all an excess of personal ambition at times when it would have been more essential at all costs to subordinate personalities. But what is no less certain is the happy result of the transition process despite many dangers which lay in



wait for it, and above all that the strategy secured its greatest successes from a perspective of the state when in political areas, which historically had been dominated by radicalization, the flag of modernization was hoisted as the central axis of its new position.

What becomes paradoxical is that the protection of this process which entails, evidently, a displacement--real or apparent--of extremes toward the center, seeks to argue that the Spanish political map should be reduced to a dual system, forgetting the numerous occasions in our history when this duality, at one time or another, has lead to the dynamics of confrontation.

Hence the concern which many of us feel. We are people who believe in dialogue and mutually responsible efforts and who think that the only way to keep Spain among the few privileged countries of the world which live under a system of democracy and liberty is to encourage tolerance and avoid the repetition of plans which failed even recently in our history.

Sons and nephews of those who fought in our civil war, we do not wish to assume a position apart but to overcome with dignity all risk of strife in an attempt at harmony, tolerance and rationality. Men and women who aspire to Spain's being the home of all, and who refuse to encourage or allow the repetition of two Spains which during decades have been looking at each other mistrustful and suspicious, to end up--as Machado's verses put it--chilling, one or the other, the hearts of new generations.

Different parliamentary minorities who received together the confidence of more than 4 million Spaniards in the 28 October elections--we have denounced repeatedly the designs which are being developed at the present time to impose this bipartisan scheme which does not correspond to the political pluralism of Spaniards, protected by our fundamental law and which bears, in addition, a permanent risk of radicalization.

It is certain that there are countries where bipartisamism works, but considerably fewer than is supposed, and with a historical reality and sociology very distinct from ours.

Our neighbor France is not bipartisan, nor is Germany, and there is, for example the case of Great Britain--so often cited by Mr Fraga--where despite the handicap which its electoral system represents, a high percentage of citizens showed in the last elections their preference for a third social-liberal alternative, apart from the Conservative and Laborite positions.

Many of us think that the third way in Spain is also not only a real possibility, but a historical necessity. And that it is precisely from a social-liberal policy, firmly bound to the defense of each and every liberty in the face of any totalitarian temptation which may exist, and from a progressive vision which aspires to endow our community with higher levels of justice and solidarity, as one ought to collaborate to consolidate our democracy to achieve the greatest participation of the people and of the elements which give structure to our society.

And we will continue working therefore in defense of this third way of a progressive center, with its own identity, different from the conservative Right and the socialist Left.

Renouncing the manipulative designs which are sought on the political map, and the consequent tactical or explicit understandings between today's majority forces, but perhaps not quite so much tomorrow. Always collaborating nevertheless in matters of state and the necessary modernization of Spain, and ready to defend the liberties and rights of Spaniards and popular sovereignty in the face of any attempt to retreat.

9678

CSO 3548/124

## DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY OF POPULATION MOVEMENT IN CATALONIA

Barcelona AVUI in Catalan 15 Nov 83 p 5

[Article by J. Playa Maset]

[Text] Increasingly, more people have been going from the big cities to the interior.

The population of Barcelona has not been growing for 10 years.

The [?atur] has made some families which have immigrated return to their places of origin, for it has also caused another much more intense phenomenon, which is interregional or interprovincial emigration. Since 1970 many more people have left Barcelona than have come to it and since 1975 other cities in its industrial belt like Cordella, Sant Adria de Besos, L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, Santa Coloma de Gramenet, Terrassa, Sabadell and Molins de Rei, also have a negative balance. The saturation of Barcelona is spreading like an oil stain towards the neighboring population centers and causes emigration towards the other regions or provinces that will contribute to some rebalancing between the districts and regions of Catalonia. In spite of everything, the importance of the youthful population explains why the Metropolitan Corporation may still have considerable growth.

Barcelona--The aspiration of many young married couples of the middle class or upper middle class is to be able to work in Barcelona and have a small house with a garden in Montgat, El Masnou, Premià, Sant Just, Sant Cugat, that is, in one of the many towns that lie within a 20-kilometer radius of the city. These, together with those who have been forced by the economic crisis to return to their places of origin or have had to move to the new industrial complexes of the metropolitan area, constitute this legion of 300,000 persons who have left Barcelona since 1970.

During these last years, the increases in population at El Cap and Casal have not reached 200,000, so that the losses in population by emigration

almost have not been able to compensate for natural growth and the city has become stabilized at around 1.75 million persons. According to a study by Josep M. Canals and Josep Novoa, the migration balance of Barcelona is negative, with minus 64,402 persons for the 1971-1975 period and minus 46,707 for 1976-1980. All the districts in Barcelona had a negative migration balance for those years, except the 11th (Francesc Macia Square, Diagonal and University Area), where more people have come than have left. Districts 1 and 5 (lower part of the city), have the highest emigration figures, of about 2500 persons each year.

Most of these emigrants have headed towards the outskirts of Barcelona, many of them motivated by the movement of new industry. A good many have headed for the industrial centers of Tarragona, Reus or Gerona, and finally there is the no less appreciable number who have decided to return to their places of origin, which they left some years ago, enticed by the industrial boom of Catalonia. An increasingly greater number of young people with liberal professions is moving to the residential centers on the outskirts of Barcelona. In this way, many suburban communities at first intended as secondary residences have been transformed into habitual dwelling places, although by day no one is home because the man and the woman of the house are working and the children are in school or at the nursery [guarderia]. For this reason, there has been a considerable increase in recent years in the population of Sant Just Desvern, Sant Pere de Ribes, Castelldefels, Tiana, etc. A distorting phenomenon of these data is that some families have been registered in taxpayer lists to the municipalities when they have a summer house or country house just to spend the vacation there surely with the hope of evading some fiscal pressure.

With the industrial expansion of the 1960's there came waves of immigrants who began concentrating in Barcelona and surrounding area. The analysts speak of growth in the form of an "oil stain" that kept spreading out from the center, Barcelona, towards L'Hospitalet, Cornellà, Santa Coloma de Gramenet and Sant Boi. The 27 municipalities of the Metropolitan Corporation, if we exclude Barcelona, grew from 257,878 inhabitants in 1950 to 1,334,121 in 1981.

From 1975 on the effects of the crisis let themselves be felt on immigration, which ended, and a reverse process began. If since 1970 Barcelona has seemed like a saturated city that expelled more people than it admitted; now this phenomenon is also spreading like an oil stain. In 1981 there was population loss by the urban centers closest to the capital, like Sant Adrià, Santa Coloma, L'Hospitalet, Cornellà or Molins de Rei. But the population of these areas continued to increase, basically because they received those who left other cities, Cerdanyola and Barbera del Valles (for the source of Ciutat Badia), Badalona, Esplugues, El Prat, Sant Boi, Viladecans and Granollers.


#### Negative Migration Balances

Since March 1981, when the census of inhabitants was taken, the last data of 1982 and 1983, despite its provisional nature, confirm this tendency to certain demographic distribution. For instance, the municipal statistics

service of L'Hospitalet de Llobregat showed that between 1 March 1983 and the same date in 1983, 6000 persons had left and a little over 2000 persons had arrived. Barcelona is no longer the only city which is stagnating: L'Hospitalet, the second in Catalonia, has gone from 295,074 inhabitants in 1981 to 291,066 in March, 1983.

If an examination is made of the most recent data from El Prat del Llobregat, one of the towns that was still increasing in population, it may be observed that in just the last 2 years it has increased by about 1200 persons, which corresponds to its natural growth, and therefore it must be assumed that now it is beginning to incorporate to the population centers with a negative migration balance.

If we leave aside the Metropolitan Corporation, we can also see how Sabadell and Terrassa, which have contributed growth to some population centers in the surrounding area, also have a negative migration balance. For the rest of Catalonia the cities with most emigration are those where there is a traditional industry which has been most affected by the crisis, as is the case of Manresa, Sallent, Cardona, Sant Vicenc de Castellet and Suria.



The municipalities shaded dark are those which have undergone population loss or whose population has not increased.

#### Growth of the Six First Cities

	Population 1975	Population 1981	Pop. Growth 1976-1981	Migration Growth 1976-1981
1. Barcelona	1,751,136	1,752,267	0.2%	-2.85%
2. L'Hospitalet	282,141	295,074	4.6%	-2.39%
3. Badalona	203,719	229,780	12.8%	+3.5 %
4. Sabadell	182,926	186,123	1.7%	-3.61%
5. Terrassa	161,409	155,974	-3.4%	-9.83%
6. St. Coloma Gramenet	138,091	140,613	1.8%	-7.25%



Municipalities of the Metropolitan Corporation  
(1976-1981 period)

	Emigration	Immigration	Migratory Balance
Barcelona	131,933	81,576	-50,357
Badalona	13,078	21,308	8,230
Cerdanyola	561	17,135	16,574
Cornella	12,771	6,728	-6,043
Esplugues	5,284	9,238	3,954
L'Hospitalet	34,011	27,232	-6,779
Molins de Rei	4,222	1,447	-2,775
El Prat	3,630	8,033	4,403
Sant Adria	6,824	3,674	3,150
Sant Boi	5,921	8,829	2,908
S. Joan Despi	3,364	2,738	-626
S. Coloma Gramenet	20,813	10,607	-10,206
Viladecans	-3,041	6,049	3,008
Total for Municipalities of the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona minus Barcelona	137,562	154,668	17,106
MCB--27 municipalities--	269,495	236,244	-33,251

\*Data prepared by the technical staff of MCB planning.

12448

CSO: 3548/113

## PSUC IN QUEST OF NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH PSC

Barcelona AVUI in Catalan 15 Nov 83 p 9

[Article by J.A.]

[Text] Barcelona--A saying by Josep Maria Sala, organizational secretary of the Catalanian Socialist Party (PSC-PSOE), could summarize graphically the present state of the matter: "It is a matter of turning the clock back, to the month of May, once municipal elections are over." This could be the spirit of the dialogue that socialists and communists are to resume, although no date has yet been set for establishing the contact and although the municipal committees of both parties have been working at it for a few weeks.

The declaration of the communist executive begins by saying that they have taken note of the resolution of the Central Committee of the PCE and accordingly reiterate their best willingness for dialogue, so as to make sure that the mayors of several places in the country and in Catalonia will be at the top of the most-voted list. The leadership of the PSUC says that this claim of the PCE had already been assumed by the Catalan communists, at the same time it was approved by the Central Committee of the PSUC, and that this has been the spirit of dialogue of the party so as to achieve the best conditions for government wherever leftist forces possess a majority. The official communique of the executive committee--AVUI had already anticipated that this decision would be made--consists of three points:

In the first, the PSUC declares it advocates following with attention the dialogue between the PCE and the PSOE to take all steps which "contribute to the improvement of the government of the town councils for the benefit of the citizens, the interests of whom we defend in spite of any narrow partisanship."

The second point is dedicated to asking the PSC "for formal talks" so as to achieve some channels of improvement for positions of government in town councils and supramunicipal institutions, like the present Metropolitan Corporation and the Deputation of Barcelona.

The final point says that the PSUC, in case this total agreement for all Spain is reached, "is ready to reconsider the occupation of the mayoralities of

Mollet and Cornellà...within the framework of a government pledge and program of action."

#### General Satisfaction

For Jordi Conill, PSUC secretary of municipal policy, this ruling "is an attempt to guarantee the government of leftist municipalities in areas as important as Baix Llobregat is now, but we must insist that there will be no negotiations about Cornellà and Mollet until there is an agreement covering the rest of the country. Certainly the situation of some of these municipalities was complicated. Just like the opposition, which was very strong. Also, it is a matter of guaranteeing the governing of fairly important municipalities, like Badalona or Santa Coloma now." We asked Conill if this decision could not cause a new crisis in the PSUC, since some councilmen of Cornellà speak of becoming independent. "I do not believe so," said the responsible municipal official, "because it is not a matter of leaving them alone or of making ordinary changes, but of assuring government." As far as other institutions are concerned, Conill told us that the same Maragall advocates examining and checking proposals in the Metropolitan Corporation and that they request entry in the government team of the representation.

Josep Maria Sala, PSC, made a "very positive" evaluation of the communist position and said that everybody knew what had been the cause of the break: not giving support to the top of the most-voted list. Sala considers that "the possible agreement which may be arrived at in Catalonia may serve to make that agreement easier for the rest of the country." Sala insists that "it is not a matter of a four-sided negotiation but only of a two-sided negotiation."

The points of view of the communist and socialist representatives are different when they ask if this could prepare a possible accord for after the elections to the Parliament. For Conill, "if the understanding occurs, it would be good for it to continue after the elections to Parliament." Sala stressed, however, that "the two issues are different and a possible agreement does not preclude a policy of alliances for after the elections."

12448

CSO: 3548/113

## SECURITY POLICY DEBATE INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATING FOR PALME

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Dec 83 p 4

[Commentary by Morten Fyhn in Stockholm]

[Text] Alarms over foreign submarines in inner waters and inflammatory partisan foreign policy "affairs" follow each other in rapid succession in Sweden today. Common to both phenomena is that they not only create domestic policy dispute, they also lead to uneasiness and confusion about what is really going on. The most important difference lies in the noise level. Made wiser by past damage, the defense system now conducts its underfinanced and still equally unsuccessful submarine hunts in silence. The "affairs," on the other hand, are becoming increasingly noisy.

Olof Palme stands at the center of most of what is happening. The prime minister is less sparing than ever of provocative statements, harsh personal criticism and rude remarks about people. He accuses newspapers and parties with views different from his own of damaging Sweden's relations with other nations, blames politicians for being so irresponsible that they need a good shaking and calls Foreign Ministry employees rotten eggs.

But Sweden's prime minister is not alone in finding himself at this low level of debate. The growing ranks of his personal enemies and political opponents let him know that he is ruling the country like an authoritarian and arbitrary president, that he is almost obsessed by his belief in his own excellence and that he has placed loyal "cronies" in central positions in order to assure full personal control for himself.

And neither side hesitates to accuse the other of lying or to jump to the mass media with dubious leaks and false rumors intended to sow doubts about the other's national spirit and credibility.

Therefore it should be established clearly that the now fairly permanent disagreement on Swedish foreign policy does not involve the very foundation, freedom from alliances in peacetime aimed at a neutral status in wartime. Sweden is not on its way into the arms of either NATO or Moscow, even if some people appear to believe this. Nor is there any reason to doubt either our willingness to defend ourselves or the fact that the ranks would

close and broad national agreement would arise if Sweden was exposed to hard external pressure by a superpower, perhaps after a new and dramatic submarine episode. Something like that could happen at any time. Submarine incursions are continuing to about the same extent as they did before and one day the navy risks making a "catch." Although there is no official proof, no one seems to doubt that the submarines are still Soviet. In that case Palme's many appeals to the Kremlin, both officially and via controversial secret contacts, have been in vain.

Foreign policy conflict in Sweden is nothing new. Conservative leader Jarl Hjalmarson, for example, was once excluded from Sweden's UN delegation by Tage Erlander and the stormy clashes over Vietnam and the United States have not been forgotten. The lines are clear. Now, as before, there is a division between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives on the terms of neutrality, their view of the Soviet Union and the strength of the armed forces. The new element is that the divisions seem to go deeper than they used to, that there have been so many "affairs" and that the background--the international situation--is no longer a remote backdrop but a hard reality in Sweden's immediate vicinity. The Soviet submarine that ran aground off Karlskrona almost 2 years ago rightly set off an entirely new debate about the danger that Sweden could be drawn directly into the arrangements of the military blocs.

U-137 was a turning point. But the rigid dispute by Social Democrats and Conservatives over what the turning point means must also be viewed in the context of what has happened in the general social debate. For the traditional "spirit of compromise" on economic policy and the building up of the so-called Swedish model is apparently gone for good. Since the middle of the 1970's the political climate has become substantially harsher. Broad solutions across bloc lines have been replaced by bitter confrontations. Thus foreign policy and security policy today are just part of many areas where irreconcilability and sharp personal differences prevail. The wage-earner fund is a key phrase.

After the Karlskrona submarine, we saw two lines. The Conservatives maintain that the Soviet Union represents a direct threat to Sweden's security and demand a firm and clearcut policy along with increased defense appropriations. The Social Democrats want to defuse the dramatic aspects of the submarine violations and prefer to talk about a strain on Swedish-Soviet relations. But both firmly maintain the principle of the inviolability of Swedish borders. There is remarkably little enthusiasm in the government party for the idea of giving more money to the defense system--which asserts that it needs 5 "new" billions over 5 years. A good deal of what happens in the Swedish foreign policy debate can be traced back to this deep disagreement over the consequences of the submarines and the financial needs of the armed forces.

The other line concentrates on the circle around Olod Palme and his hand-picked men, not all of whom are equally successful. Foreign Minister



Lennart Bodstrom, for example, uses a lot of his time to explain what he really said and meant and to offer assurances that he is sure that Palme is keeping him informed on foreign policy moves.

There are many more or less official cooks involved in implementing Swedish security policy and at times they have created uncertainty as to whether Sweden's real views on both a Nordic nuclear-free zone and the security policy situation in the Nordic region have changed or not.

Bodstrom's undersecretary, Pierre Schori, is the strong man in the Foreign Ministry and Palme's confidant. The appointments of both Schori and UN Ambassador Anders Ferm were examples of "cronies" outside the diplomatic ranks who scrambled to the top. Critical voices claim--not without reason--that Swedish foreign policy moves under Palme have been of poor quality and that they have been inadequately prepared. Palme is impatient and he wants results. He wants to distinguish himself internationally.

In this kind of climate, there is fertile soil for leaks and "affairs," concerning, for example, the so-called Bodstrom doctrine, Egon Bahr's influence, Carl Bildt and Ferm's contact with Arbatov. It is likely that both the submarine violations and the "affairs" will continue in the future.

6578

CSO: 3639/46

## ACTIVIST INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF FOREIGN MINISTER BODSTROM EXAMINED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial by Olof Santesson: "In European Peace Role"]

[Text] Last Thursday, Lennart Bodstrom spoke of the responsibility of Sweden and our part of the world for peace. These days the international perspective is marked by a series of breaks in negotiations between the super powers. It is a sign of the times that a Social Democratic foreign minister also speaks solely about Europe. The address at the Institute of Foreign Policy had a maredly sombre impact.

In its tangible points, the speech was still a fairly well thought out and well-grounded manifestation of the opinion of a coalition government.

This is especially noticeable when the foreign minister touches on the conditions of a nuclear-free zone. Last fall, in a speech in Helsinki, he created a certain confusion by mentioning a Scandinavian agreement and super power commitments, respectively as two separate items even in time. "First when both of these demands are met, can the zone become a reality?" says Bodstrom onw. This, of course, is an essential remark, more clearly conveyed in this speech, than in the foreign minister's article the same day in the SVENSKA DAGBLADET. Somewhat speedier information would have been better; seven weeks have elapsed since the DAGENS NYHETER questioned what Bodstrom had said then.

But to Europe! "The present day opposition between the super powers is not only more serious than perhaps at any time during the postwar period, but also much more general and of a more radical character," asserts Sweden's foreign minister. The three earlier crises that Bodstrom uses for comparison (Berlin, Korea, Cuba) were more confined, but surely they were hotter than those of today. As the foreign minister himself points out, we have to assume both that peace can be preserved and that armament reduction is possible.

The struggle for relaxation of tension still has its strongest support in Europe, maintains Bodstrom. "It is important to the Europeans, especially during periods of strong opposition between the super powers, that contracts

between East and West are maintained." In this connection it is surprising to hear him speak of "the difficulties resulting from the division of Europe"--such allusions usually cause Social Democrats to squirm anxiously.

After a somewhat exaggerated picture of the importance of EDC in the political security cooperation in the West, the foreign minister comes to the conclusion that the relative mutual understanding between the western European countries, concerning fundamental political security questions, has decreased. He thinks that something similar has occurred in and between the Warsaw Pact countries.

Here Bodstrom's reasoning comes to a halt. Pity. In the last issue of the Institute of Foreign Policy publication, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, the scholar, Karl Birnbaum, believes, for instance, that "Western Europe ought to strive for a more independent security policy, if the efforts to find new democratic grounds for this policy will be successful."

More critically, it can, of course, be said that the Western Alliance would probably gain from an increased self-assertion on the part of Western Europe, while anything equivalent in Eastern Europe would cause considerable anxiety to the Soviet system. It is understandable that a Swedish government has difficulties in embarking upon analysing which of these changes will be in our interest and whether we even ought to or can contribute to them. Still, a Swedish debate on this point should be interesting.

For his part, Bodstrom chooses to discuss the need for balance between the power blocks. Sweden contributes to such a balance by asserting its territorial integrity--according to the foreign minister, it is especially important for a non-aligned country to react forcefully against violations of its frontiers. Thus it costs more to be non-aligned. Even purely militarily?

Politically in any case, one of the most important duties of Swedish diplomacy will be to quickly bring out security and confidence producing measures at the coming Stockholm conference.

With his emphasis on a gradual increase in the ambitions in this respect, Lennart Bodstrom reasons in a gratifyingly constructive manner.

And then he wants foreign and defense policy to be discussed--not to be above the parties, Cheery information in any event.

12339  
CSO: 3650/79

## ELLEMANN APPEALS TO SDP FOR UNITY ON SECURITY POLICY, TALKS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Dec 83 p 8

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich: "Ellemann Asks the Social Democratic Party for a Dialogue on Security Policy"]

[Text] The foreign minister thinks that the debate on security policy should be switched away from guided missiles and up onto another plane for the purpose of working actively for an improvement in East-West relations.

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen is asking the Social Democratic Party for a dialogue for the purpose of restoring broad unity in the Folketing on foreign policy and security policy on the basis of NATO's Brussels declaration and the Permanent Council's coming study of the East-West relations.

#### Debate on a Broader Plane

"NATO demonstrated its vitality and its ability to keep from getting stuck fast in individual problems last week. Instead, NATO showed a desire to look ahead by maintaining its military strength and simultaneously making sure of having popular support for the alliance," Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said yesterday at a meeting of the Liberal Party's defense committee for the Copenhagen administrative district.

"The government of this country wants to do anything it can to make sure that NATO will be successful, and we Danes should take advantage of this chance to lead the debate away from the controversial subject matter that has characterized the debate on Denmark's membership in NATO in 1983," the foreign minister said.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen thought that it "had not been possible to see the woods for the trees" in last year's debate on missiles. "In the coming year, we should make an effort to raise the debate up onto a broader security-policy plane. Not that we should forget about missiles, but in order to improve the chances for better relations between the East and the West," the foreign minister said.

#### A Question Mark in Regard to the Dual Decision

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen raised "the question, in the light of subsequent events, as to whether the dual decision of 1979 was so smart, after all, since it opened up the way for a massive propaganda campaign by the Soviet Union.

"Perhaps it would have been better to have deployed the missiles right at the beginning, and then to have started the negotiations. In any case, there is a widespread feeling in NATO that it will be easier to obtain an agreement now where Western weapons are being deployed," Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said.

In response to a question as to what he thought about the commodity that the Folketing had appointed him to sell to NATO, the minister said, "I will do the smart thing and refrain from judging the commodity's quality."

"The crucial point is that the government has chosen to accept what was on the agenda on the strength of weighty economic considerations in order to save this country's economy, and that also has something to do with Denmark's reputation abroad."

On the possibility of a vote on the budget in the Folketing, the foreign minister said: "A vote on economic policy would be the best conceivable point of departure for the government. "But I want to see it, now, before I will believe it. Ever since childhood, I have been skeptical about all large Christmas presents," Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said.

9266

CSO: 3613/61



MILITARY

DENMARK/GREENLAND

BRIEFS

EAST BLOC SUBMARINES IN WATERS--Submarines from Warsaw Pact countries have been active in the waters off Greenland this summer. That was stated by the Defense Command on Monday in a press release following an analysis of some communications buoys that had been collected and against the background of reports from people around Disko, on the west coast of Greenland, who believed they had seen submarines in that area. ~~Text~~ /Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Dec 83 p 27 9266

CSO: 3613/60

## PAPER APPROVES MOVE TO INCREASE REFRESHER TRAINING

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 25 Nov 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Attention to Military Preparedness"]

[Text] Finland has become used to variations in the temperature of high politics and we have not become hysterical even during cold time periods. Our military preparedness will, however, always have to be developed, calmly and with common sense. It should be especially remembered that the conditions have changed from what they were decades ago.

Our emergency powers acts thus are still mainly based on the traditional concept according to which they are needed only during an actual state of war. Special measures might, however, also be needed in a situation where no actual open warfare exists--at least not in our own country.

Minister of Defense Veikko Pihlajamaki stated indeed at the opening of the national defense courses last Monday, that a long corroding crisis is possibly more likely than an open conflict. It is necessary to increase the military preparedness for this reason, because if actual problems arise, there may not be any time for the legislative process.

Our current military law is from the 1930's and the work obligation law from the 1940's. There is, however, a fairly new emergency powers acts for the regulation of the economic life. The main parts of our military preparedness law are, however, out of date, or at least too narrow for the current circumstances in regard to its range of application.

The parliamentary committee proposed a package for crisis preparedness already in 1979, but it has remained in the political refrigerator. In this matter the extreme leftist groups have seen ghosts in the middle of the day, whereas the Social Democratic Party has wanted to reform the state of war law in this context.

Hopefully Minister Pihlajamaki's prognosis that the military preparedness law will be submitted to the parliament next year will come true. It is childish to imagine that, under Finland's circumstances, it would be possible to abuse the emergency powers act for the breaking down of the democracy. Such action was to no serious extent tried even during the

1930's and the 1940's when our democracy was far younger and on a far more fragile basis than now.

Besides the legislative preparedness the problems of the era also demand an increase in the military defense effectiveness--above all the strengthening of the credibility of our ability to defend our country. This has often before been seen as a matter of military preparedness. At the courses in national defense Commander of the Armed Forces Jaakko Valtanen paid attention to at least one important factor, that is: refresher training.

Many people may think, in a conservative manner, that the military training is still mainly based on recruit service. Valtanen, however, placed refresher training at the top.

The increased refresher training is a fairly cheap way to increase our defense preparedness, especially since the recruit age groups are continually decreasing. And the trained reserve of over 1 million men continues to be the central factor of our ability to defend ourselves; in that regard we are able to compete with far larger countries even considering the number of men. All we need to do is to guarantee the quality of the reserve.

The defensive forces of our country are among the central factors of our foreign policy. Sufficient refresher training will increase the credibility of our defense capacity and willingness--which is already preventive protection.

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CSO: 3617/54

## FULLER DETAILS OF 1984-1988 DEFENSE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM

Paris ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITES in French 11 Nov 83 p 24

[Article: The 1984-1988 Military Programming Law Calls For Outlays of 850 Billion Francs for Arms Modernization"]

[Text] The military programming law [5-year defense plan] calls for a defense budget of 830 billion francs for the period 1984-1988. Funds allocated to the armed forces will increase moderately in 1984--142.1 billion francs--and 1985--151.5 billion francs--and experience sustained growth from 1986 to 1988 (536.4 billion francs for that period). Equipment spending will rise steadily: 47 percent in 1984, 48 percent in 1985, and reach 51.5 percent by 1988. Equipment funding for the nuclear deterrent forces from 1986 to 1988 will account for nearly 32 percent of the budget during that period. Lastly, the conventional forces modernization budget will increase 7.8 percent in 1984 from 1983 (base index of 100), 18.2 percent in 1985, and 51.8 percent during the period 1986-1988. Defense requirements and funding may be reassessed in 1986 upon review of the status report to be submitted to Parliament in 1985. The National Assembly is currently considering the proposed 1984 budget which calls for, inter alia, placement of 50 percent of the military procurement orders prescribed by the programming law for the first 2 years.

## Nuclear Force

The programming law provides for modernization of the Strategic Nuclear Force. The Strategic Naval Force's sixth nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) will be commissioned in 1985. It will be armed with 16 multiple-warhead M-4 nuclear missiles. The other SSBN's, except the "Redoutable," are to be modified to carry the M-4. Much of their equipment will also be updated. The law includes a provision for initiating construction of an advanced generation SSBN between 1986 and 1988. This submarine will become operational in 1994. It will be an extremely silent boat and have an increased running depth. It could be armed with a more effective multiple-warhead missile.

The Strategic Nuclear Force's aircraft component will also be updated. A total of 19 Mirage 4 [bombers] will be modified--starting in 1987--to carry the standoff medium-range air-to-surface missile (ASMP). Reengining of 11 C-135

tankers will be completed during this same period. In 1996, the SX [mobile strategic ballistic] missile will take over the role currently assigned to the Mirage 4.

Work will continue on hardening communications systems against all forms of nuclear and conventional attack. The hardened airborne communications system will be operational by 1988.

The aircraft component will be modernized with 11 nuclear attack Mirage 2000N aircraft armed with the medium-range air-to-surface missile (ASMP) and scheduled to become operational starting in 1988. In addition, aircraft carriers and 50 Super Etendard naval aircraft--10 to be ordered in 1984-1985 and 40 in 1986-1987--will be retrofitted to accomodate this missile.

The Hades [mobile tactical nuclear missile] system will be issued to regiments currently armed with the Pluton missile, at a rate of one regiment per year beginning in 1992. The Hades systems are to be deployed within a "large" [brigade level or higher] nuclear unit assigned to the direct operational control of the armed forces chief of staff, in other words, as close as possible to the political decision-making authority. A total of 70 Hades launch and fire control units are to be procured: 32 in 1984-1985 and 38 in 1986-1988.

Development of the enhanced radiation weapon is continuing. The programming law does not call for its production but leaves the possibility of such a decision fully open.

#### Army

By 1990, the army will field 400 combat and miscellaneous type helicopters, 1,100 tanks, 450 artillery pieces, and approximately 8,000 armored vehicles. The programming law calls for activation of a Rapid Action [deployment] Force (FAR) of five divisions equipped with modern high-performance materiel.

One of these divisions is the airmobile FHAC [Antitank Helicopter Force]. It will have 90 antitank helicopters, 30 support-protection [air-to-air combat] helicopters (HAP), 80 tactical transport and utility helicopters, and an antitank infantry regiment. The FAR can be called upon to intervene, with all or part of its units, in Europe within the Atlantic Alliance framework or in support of an armored corps, or in territorial operational defense missions, or overseas, of course, in a military assistance role.

The army will procure the following: 30 SA342 [Gazelle] and HAP helicopters in 1984-1985 plus 50 in 1986-1988; 182 AMX-30B2 tanks in 1984-1985 and 273 in 1986-1988; 60 Milan antitank missile systems in 1984-1985; 6 Roland surface-to-air missile systems in 1984-1985; 10 very short-range surface-to-air missile systems (SATCP) in 1984-1985 plus 305 in 1986-1988; 127 escort-type armored vehicles in 1984-1985 and 92 in 1986-1988; 486 forward-area armored vehicles in 1984-1985 plus 855 in 1986-1988; 600 light armored vehicles in 1986-1988; and 7,000 tactical motor vehicles in 1984-1985 and 15,500 in 1986-1988.



## Navy

Long-range planning is especially necessary for the navy. Successive programming laws establish for a period of 5 to 6 years the funding and equipment procurement requirements to meet a desired goal by the year 2000. That goal consists of a Strategic Naval Force of six to seven nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) and a naval aviation force of more than 300,000 tons comprised of 112 ships and 247 combat aircraft. In 1983, the navy already has five SSBN's in service plus a naval aviation force of 288,000 tons. The programming law calls for an average ship construction rate of more than 10,000 tons per year.

Procurement called for by the programming law constitutes a large financial effort. No major naval program will be neglected. By end-1988, the French Navy will have 6 SSBN's, 211 combat aircraft, and 96 ships. The naval aviation force's tonnage will amount to more than 264,000 tons. This slight drop in tonnage will be only transitory. It is due to the ageing of the ships in service as a result of insufficient procurement of new ships during the preceding 10 years. It will be offset by a rejuvenation of the fleet whose average age will drop from 17 years in 1983 to 12 years in 1988. This favorable development will be achieved through lower operating expenditures and a limited reduction in manpower.

The key point in the navy's program is construction, beginning in 1986, of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier scheduled to replace the "Clemenceau" by 1995. This 35,000-ton, catapult equipped carrier will accommodate Super Etendard aircraft and subsequently their successors developed from the experimental demonstrator combat aircraft (ACX). The security of the Strategic Naval Force will be enhanced by placement in 1984 of initial production orders for new Atlantic 2 [second generation] maritime patrol aircraft (two in 1984-1985 and 14 in 1986-1988), delivery of "Eridan" class tripartite [built by France, Belgium, and the Netherlands] minehunters, and initial construction orders for ocean minesweepers.

The navy's antisubmarine warfare force will be strengthened by construction of three additional nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). The Falklands war demonstrated the tremendous deterrent power of this weapon system. Before the end of the century, France will have eight submarines of this type.

The navy's operational troop transport capability will be maintained by acquisition of three dock landing ships.

In any case, the surface fleet--combat and support ships--will be rejuvenated and modernized.

Along with the procurement of missiles and ammunition, efforts will center upon research and development of weapons of new advanced design. The SM-39 [Exocet] antiship missile--24 systems to be ordered in 1984-1985 and 36 in 1986-1988--will arm the nuclear-powered attack submarines and is capable of underwater launch. The lightweight Murene homing torpedo--70 to be ordered in 1984-1985, 190 in 1986-1988--will equip our naval forces during the next 10 years. Antimissile weapons are also programmed.

## Air Force

The programming law states that the air force will retain a first-line complement of 450 combat aircraft by acquiring a total of 165 Mirage 2000 aircraft, including nuclear strike Mirage 2000N's, during the period: 56 will be ordered in 1984-1985, 109 in 1986-1988.

Beginning in 1983, the Mirage 2000DA [air defense version] will bolster France's air defenses, notably with its enhanced detection and low-altitude interception capabilities provided initially by that aircraft's multifunction Doppler radar and subsequently by its pulsed Doppler radar.

In September 1983, the Mirage FICR [reconnaissance aircraft] began replacing the older Mirage 3 and 3D aircraft in the air force's 33d Reconnaissance Wing. This new aircraft will improve intelligence collection considerably from a continuity standpoint thanks to the aircraft's navigation system and new sensors incorporating the latest technological advances.

During this period, the air force will also deploy other systems, thereby increasing the compatibility between its different elements:

- a. The acquisition of early warning aircraft will appreciably increase warning time because of the resultant improved capability of detecting and assessing the low-altitude air threat. Procurement orders for such an airborne warning system will be issued in 1986-1988 in two "slices." We know that the defense minister has still not announced his choice between the two aircraft systems under consideration. One candidate is the Boeing E-3A AWACS, the other is European, namely the British Nimrod or else the Nimrod's Marconi avionics integrated with the Transall [transport aircraft] or Atlantic [maritime patrol aircraft].
- b. The programming law also calls for weapons modernization: existing high-performance aircraft will be equipped with advanced-technology air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons having greater destructive power and a longer standoff range.
- c. Work underway on development of offensive and defensive electronic warfare equipment will continue.
- d. Passive defense facilities for air force personnel and equipment will be further enhanced with the construction of additional shelters. Measures to improve the active defense capability include continued acquisition of Crotale [surface-to-air] missiles and the entry into service of the very short-range surface-to-air missile (SATCP) in the very near future.

The air force will order 60 Epsilon [basic trainer aircraft] in 1984-1985, 12 helicopters in 1984-1985 and 18 in 1986-1988, 415 air-to-air missiles in 1984-1985 and 780 in 1986-1988, 181 surface-to-air missiles in 1984-1985 and 330 in 1986-1988, and 654 advanced-technology air-to-surface weapons in 1984-1985 plus 1,534 in 1986-1988.

Also implicit in the programming law are the necessity and determination to prepare for the period beyond 1988. During the next decade, Mirage 3, Mirage 5, and Jaguar tactical aircraft will reach the end of their useful operating life after more than 20 years of service. Hence a future land-based tactical combat aircraft (ACT) is already under study. This aircraft will incorporate the most sophisticated technologies in numerous fields such as propulsion, aerodynamics, flight controls, avionics, and weaponry. To this end, the decision to build an experimental fighter, the ACX, was made in 1983. The ACX is expected to make its maiden flight before the end of 1986.

### Industrial Manpower

Defense in the broadest sense of the term, employs the services of more than 1.5 million persons, or 7 percent of the country's working population. The armed forces employ 625,000 and the arms industry 310,000. Approximately 4 percent of France's industrial manpower is currently employed in the arms industry. Procurement provisions of the programming law will create at least 35,000 new jobs in the industrial sector during the 5-year period covered by that law.

Industrial jobs created by arms procurement constitute two-thirds of all jobs in the aircraft and electronics sectors and one-half of the jobs in the Atomic Energy Commission. Equipment procurement orders from the armed forces account for 50 to 100 percent of the business of many companies.

There will be sustained industrial activity in such key sectors as aerospace, computers and data processing, shipbuilding, and army-type weapons and equipment. The programming law's requirements will stimulate major advances in the nonconsumer goods sector of the electronics industry.

The law strongly emphasizes the fact that new weapon systems must attain high levels of performance. The effectiveness of such systems implies a high degree of automation and the use of powerful computers. The necessity of supplying increasingly sophisticated equipment makes it imperative that the arms industry intensify its efforts to modernize and become more competitive.

One of the military programming law's goals is to prevent occurrence of a technological gap between France and other industrial countries, a gap likely to undermine the credibility of our military establishment. To prepare for the future, a large share of the defense budget should be earmarked for studies and research.

The programming law includes a provision for allocating one-fourth of the equipment budget to research. Such an effort will contribute to the modernization of such forward-looking sectors and technologies as data processing, automation, electro-optics, telecommunications, and materials technology. During the 5-year period in question, more than 30 percent of government research funds will be expended by the Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, companies are being asked to finance a sufficient amount of research with their own funds.

## PUBLISHER OF ANTI-MILITARY TRACTS: MOVEMENT WILL END ARMY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Defense To Be Fought Down Over Time"]

[Text] "What is involved here is whether crimes have been committed against the security of the Kingdom," said Justice Minister Mona Rokke when the Storting inquired into the search and confiscation of the newspaper IKKEVOLD and the organization People's Anti-War Movement. Whether or not IKKEVOLD has damaged the security of the realm is not yet known. The matter is classified and silence has been imposed upon those involved. The newspaper's revelation concerning a top secret American listening post at Andoya was probably a contributory cause for the police action at Goteborg Street 8 on 13 October. The People's Movement Against War (FMK) has as its goal reformation of Norwegian society and abolishment of our military forces.

This organization owns the newspaper IKKEVOLD. FMK wishes in its efforts to further develop nonviolent means such as demonstrations boycotts, strikes, massive civil disobedience, noncooperation, nonviolent sabotage and occupation. This is apparent from the organization's plans. It is thus in favor of non-parliamentarian forms of action.

"Tom Nielsen, as leader of the day-to-day actions of the FMK, how can you describe sabotage and occupation as nonviolent means?"

"It sounds somewhat strange, perhaps, but we are thinking of sabotage against materiel, not against people. Personally, I can imagine using such action against an occupant," Nielsen says. The FMK is heavily engaged in the work for human rights, but the organization's most important area of effort is the anti-military struggle. Here the focus is upon refusal to do any service in support of the military apparatus. Further, the basis is to be laid for a transition to a nonviolent defense.

To reach its goal of a total change of our social system the FMK has planned a strategy to be carried out in five phases. In the first phase, people must be made aware of the need for a change in the system. "Great ingenuity is needed to reach most people. Militarism can be hit with 'small stings', but it cannot be destroyed before a majority of the people think its destruction is necessary and favor it. This is stated in FMK's 'Political Platform'."

The next phase is the organization phase, during which the awareness and direct actions lead to establishment of organizations in various areas and in various forms. Stressed as very important are international support agreements, nonaggression agreements, and promises of joint strikes against the military in future conflict situations.

The reform, solidarity, and noncooperation phase is initiated when the rational and international organization and awareness effort has become so extensive that the carrying out of planned actions begins. Such actions can be executed to defend rights earlier gained or to force through radical reforms.

Alternative institutions will also arise in the day-to-day struggle. They may be new ways of housing, farm and factory collectives, factories taken over, separate stores, publishers, cultural institutions, etc. These alternative institutions, it is said, cannot be totally liberated "islands." The capitalist society that surrounds them will always limit their opportunities. But, it is pointed out, they arise as means in the struggle against the authoritarian power apparatus.

The last phase is the intervention, occupation and massive confrontation phase. This phase involves a mass struggle for progressive policies. "At that time the struggle of the masses, their organization and institutions have become so extensive that they are a real threat to those in power." The FMK asserts that in such a situation the rulers will initiate extensive repressive measures. But through a nonviolent struggle the attacks will be beaten back. This will be done as follows: through occupation of plants, institutions, communications, etc. Other parts of the system, such as the military apparatus, will be destroyed by means of sabotage.

On two occasions the FMK has arranged "peace efforts" at Rygge airfield. Through information work, rock concerts, blockading the airfield, religious services, direct actions on the airfield, study work, samba dancing, training in nonviolence, and festivals the organization wished to attain the following: to have published and invalidated the COB [expansion unknown] agreement entered into between the United States and Norway, among others. The agreement involves making more Norwegian airfields ready for American aircraft in a crisis situation. The newspaper IKKEVOLD reveals several military installations in our country, among others the undersea listening system SOSUS [expansion unknown] at Andoya. Some years ago in a members publication the FMK urged its members: "Map military installations near your home. Send the information to us."

"Tom Nielsen, why is it so important to you to reveal our defense installations?"

"Because they are a threat to our security."

"Threat?"

"Yes. Because in their existence they constitute a threat to the enemy. Therefore they will be exposed to bombing, which will involve extermination of the civilian population of the area."



"In the opinion of many you serve the interests of the Soviet Union by publishing military secrets."

"Nonsense. Soviet Union is already in possession of the information we forward. Believing anything else is very naive. In addition, the Russians use other methods than we do. The FMK's methods are legal. Our task is that of informing Norwegian opinion, says the day-to-day leader of the People's Anti-War Movement.

This organization with 1500 members is part of a world-wide movement, War Resisters International

11,256

CSO: 3639/38

## POLICE SEIZE DOCUMENTS FROM 'SECRET NORWAY' PUBLISHER

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norweigan 19 Nov 83 p 20

[Article: "Documents Seized"]

[Text] On Friday the police undertook a surprise raid on Atheneum Publishers A/S, which has published the book "Secret Norway" by former major and editor Christian Christensen (CC). Two investigators confiscated the publisher's correspondence file dealing with the CC book and the author's rough draft of the book. Ragnar Aamodt, head of the publishing firm, says to NTB [Norwegian Press Bureau] that this time the police had court authority to undertake the raid and the confiscation, which was not the case in the said at the home of CC, which had been announced in advance.

NTB talked with the publishing company chief and CC just before Aamodt was to appear at police headquarters in Oslo for a hearing. Both state that neither of the two visits by the police produced anything of importance.

CC said: "Previously I had quite a few documents, procured in various ways, but these I burned in my fireplace at the time the book was published, not because I feared a police action, but because I had no reason to keep them any longer. I still have some information, but it is well kept in my head.

[Question] But were no documents stamped secret burned in your fireplace?

[Answer] They were older documents not stamped, and I cannot now say whether or not they were classified.

CC himself cannot understand that he has written anything that could harm the country's security; he thinks he has balanced on the right side.

Considering the reaction among his sources and others he has been in contact with in and outside defense CC says the following: "On the whole the reaction is good, but there are those who think I should have been even more thorough and put the whole thing into a better perspective."

For Atheneum, a new publishing firm, "Secret Norway" has been a great success. Up until now 8,000 copies of the book have been sold, and a third printing of the book is on the way.

## COMMENT URGES COHERENT RECONCILIATION OF NATO, EEC POLICIES

Madrid ABC in Spanish 11 Dec 83 p 15

[Text] Europe and the West are two different, though not separate, ideas and realities. Europe used to be the West and now forms part of it. For this reason, it is very difficult, not to say impossible, to formulate European projects and, at the same time, forget that western influences and underpinnings are implicit in them because of historical, political, defense and economic realities in the reality of Europe itself. The unitary nature of the West necessarily includes all of Europe. This is not refuted by the fact that half of Europe has been the victim of a mythological kidnapping and is a hostage of what has historically been its antithesis. The Soviet military occupation of half of the European continent, so far from contradicting the western identity of the whole complex, reveals that unity is not an objective that foreign offices eventually may discard but, rather, a fact which they must take into account.

It is our obligation to note this fact. To remember it and act accordingly is the obligation of those responsible for Spanish foreign policy. Diplomatic voluntarism (perhaps the most dangerous of the many that may be found in politics) should yield, generally and coherently, before the evidence that, neither in theory nor in concrete actions, can the questions relating to our EEC policy be separated from those belonging to our NATO policy. The Europe of the market-place is also the Europe of politics and defense. The former and latter are a seamless whole, of which the complex represented by the community of defense and political interests that constitute NATO also forms an indivisible part.

The socialist government's foreign policy has not sufficiently taken into account the profound interrelationship between western matters and European matters. Blocking recognition of this reality is the insubstantial intention to have a vaguely autonomous policy, as if our national interests were peripheral to this European and western reality. Spanish foreign policy has operated like an automobile with two gearshifts and two steering wheels. The emphasis that has been put on Community policy, with necessarily reiterated demands that the waiting period for admission be shortened, is not consistent with--indeed, is contrary to--the emphasis on freezing our military effectiveness and the policy of integration into NATO formulated

by the previous government. With respect to the one, we stepped on the accelerator; with respect to the other, we applied the brakes. Thus, by means of two different and opposed courses, we looked for two separate doors, when in fact there was only one door to which to direct ourselves and only one direction in which to proceed.

This is the way things were but apparently have begun to be no longer. The Spanish Government has just adhered to a NATO communique published in Brussels. This is a change of the greatest significance, because it seems to establish as a principle of the socialist government acceptance of the identity of policy toward Europe and toward the West. And perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of this change (which, in principle, is the equivalent of the change made by the socialist government in the foreign policy of democratic Spain) is that it came about in the context of a degree of tension in East-West relations the closest antecedent of which is the 1962 crisis caused by the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Nevertheless, though the change has been initiated, it is still insufficient in its most indicative terms. In this connection, the reservation made by Minister Moran with regard to "Euromissiles" is very meaningful. There is apparent here a worrisome continuity with the confusion of the past, with the mutual contradictions among different levels of definition and even at the level of the prime minister himself.

Moreover, why is the NATO document not, as Moran says, one that Spain can accept in full? It is acceptable that NATO threatens no one; that none of its weapons will be used for an attack; that it does not aspire to superiority, though it opposes others acquiring it; and that the legitimate security interests of the West can be guaranteed only through a solid union between Europe and the United States.

Finally, it is acceptable that NATO has called upon the USSR to respect the legitimate security interests of the West, just as the West respects the Soviets' interests.

Now, if all these points are granted and accepted, why make a reservation concerning "Euromissiles?" Neither politically nor morally does the deployment of these contradict any of the points in the statement that have been cited. And if there is neither contradiction nor fault in the logic of the matter, how does one explain the existence of this residual ambiguity in the definition of a position vis-a-vis the West in Spanish foreign policy?

As Moran warned in his statements in Brussels, the EEC is not neutral from a political standpoint. Is it not senseless then to maintain in one form or another different views and different policies for Europe as an economic entity and for the West as a mutual support system?

## COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC VERSUS POLITICAL CRITERIA FOR EEC ENTRY

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 9 Dec 83 p 5

[Commentary by Manuel Funes Robert]

[Text] Among the several prophecies with the realization of which fortune has rewarded me is the one that Spain's entry into the EEC is nonviable, impossible, unthinkable and, thanks to the obstinacy of all Spanish governments for more than 20 years, a source of continuing humiliation for such a nation as ours, which once played a great role in world history and today, owing to the work of its professional politicians, has lost its standing and dignity.

And, in this matter, we again encounter the negative impact on the government's work of the economist who is not motivated by such values as national dignity, decorum, etc., and who, together with the politician, would sell his soul to the devil in order to achieve the merit of being firmly united with his foreign colleagues. The Franco regime committed the error of appointing and keeping an ambassador accredited to an organization that did not recognize us, though the truth is that we were then treated by the EEC as we would like to be now. The long years of useless waiting were due to the inferiority complex of the Spanish Europeanists, who would not consider themselves Europeans until the others certified they were, coupled with the belief that the dictatorship was the reason for rejection. This sad picture of government teams which, without regard to their political coloration, put success in this matter before everything else is completed by the inability of the diplomats of that time and the present to understand the indirect language in which they manifested their disdain for us. After the return of democracy, when we went about hat in hand, humiliatingly cooling our heels, in order to set forth projects that interested no one but ourselves, the subject did not prosper. The worst came after socialism's advent. Like importunate beggars, who refuse to go away and continue with lamentations to ask for alms, we have forced the EEC to send us packing once and for all and without second thoughts. And the last straw is that, instead of facing up to the facts with dignity, we even declare our willingness shamefully to cool our heels indefinitely. They are going to have to resort to violence to get rid of our importuning.



Entry depends, and will always depend, on decisive economic factors. Our inland agriculture, which is of a lower quality than that of the Community, would convert us into applicants for money from the Community fund set up to equalize prices through subsidization of the least capable. The Community's farmers would sooner rise up in bloody revolt than allow a potential competitor to make off with the money. And the intensive agriculture of outlying areas is an everlasting threat to that of the Community because of its superior efficiency. So it is that the bad Spanish agriculture impedes the entry of a competitor because of money, and the good agriculture impedes the entry of an efficient competitor. If today they burn our trucks that are going to be sold to Sweden, whom will they burn when we get the right to sell those trucks in southern France? They will burn the French government, whatever it may then be. And those who will not sacrifice themselves to put an end to terrorism in Spain, will not put themselves at risk to please Spanish politicians, who are anxious, because of their few victories, to have a spectacular one that will compensate them for so many failures.

As if the obstacle described above were not enough, there is still another: impelled by its mad desire for integration, this government team, in contrast to preceding ones, has decided to anticipate the Community's demands, ceding in advance what could be asked of us only as the price of entry. Does the VAT (value added tax) prevail in the EEC? Let us put it into effect in Spain to see whether they will soften up and take pity on our importuning. Does the Treaty of Rome prohibit monopolies? Let us dismantle Campsa to please them and, as neither these nor other things will soften them up, we will find ourselves one day with the multinational oil companies again in control of our market, as they were until 1927, and without having secured the entry for which we are dying.

With regard to another matter, nobody has stopped to consider the fact that "the" entry is not one but an infinite number in its concrete possibilities. Just as our poor leaders speak of "the" fiscal reform, as if there were only one, whereas there is an infinite number, some good and some bad, just as the same incompetents speak today of "the" reconversion, as if there were only one and not an infinite number, they refer to "the" entry without troubling themselves to think that an entry in the initial phase of adhesion is a complex of reciprocal tariff reductions within a fixed period. From among the infinite possible variables of integration, with respect to both timing and degree, we would have to choose only one to determine whether we achieve integration whole or destroyed.

Finally, we could resort to the posture of the fox and the grapes for two reasons: our would-be companions of tomorrow are really getting along badly and, moreover, as I have been saying for years, Spain is already integrated into the EEC insofar as what matters most is concerned, viz., we exchange a large volume of goods with it.

## INCREASES REGISTERED IN JOBLESS, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES

Madrid ABC in Spanish 11 Dec 83 p 57

[Text] The number of unemployed registered with the employment office of the INEM at the end of November increased by 32,758 and reached a total of 2,298,306 which, compared with the October figure, represents an increase of 1.45 percent, according to the information service of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

During the same month last year, unemployment grew by 4.95 percent, owing principally to a decrease in business investment as a result of the election campaign and, in addition, an increase in registrations with employment offices by people hoping to be placed under the new government instructions. In the first 11 months of 1982, registered unemployment reached 18.64 percent, while in the same period of the present year, it has fallen to 6.85 percent.

Analysis by production sectors shows a noteworthy reduction of unemployment in agriculture, 5.48 percent, as a result principally of the jobs provided through EEC employment. On the other hand, confirming the experience of the previous month, the services sector suffered the largest increase, both in absolute terms--33,899 people--and in relative terms--6.03 percent. The seasonal factor was the determining one in this increase, once the tourist and hotel season ended. The changes in industry and construction were hardly noticeable. In the former, unemployment increased by 0.15 percent as compared with the October figure, while in the latter a decline of 0.23 percent was registered.

The total number of workers without previous employment underwent a modest increase of 0.54 percent and reached 681,389, or 3,646 more than the number registered in October. In summary, according to general INEM estimates, the increase in unemployment during the month is attributable to the negative effects during this period of seasonal variations in the services sector, since increases and decreases in the remaining sectors of production canceled each other out.

Suspension of Payment

In the first 11 months of the current year, the accumulated debt of businesses that declared suspension of payments or bankruptcy before Catalan courts reached 80.5 billion pesetas, which makes it likely that, by year's end, it will reach the sum of 85 billion.

March was the month with the highest increase in indebtedness, owing to the sizeable suspension of payments by the Torras (Torras Hostench e Industrial Cartonera) paper-manufacturing group, which showed a negative balance of 23,333 million, the largest ever registered in Catalonia. Other firms experiencing financial difficulties were Textil Puignero, with a negative balance of 9,433 million; Rocalla, 1,878 million; the Gerona-based group Grau Font, 1,850 million; Inbesa, 1,817 million; Torras Domenech, 1,597 million; and Coesa, 1,498 million. The sectors with the largest numbers of firms suspending payments were: machinery, textiles, construction and electronics.

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CSO: 3548/138

## UGT THREATENS TOUGHENED POSITION ON REINDUSTRIALIZATION

Madrid ABC in Spanish 11 Dec 83 p 55

[Text] The General Union of Workers [UGT] yesterday declared that it has decided to mobilize its forces to defend its positions on the decree-law on Reconversion and Reindustrialization; this declaration was contained in an announcement made yesterday following debate on the subject by the executive bodies of the confederation and the metalworkers union throughout the preceding day.

This statement marks an evident toughening of the positions the UGT has hitherto maintained toward the government. Nevertheless, the communique published yesterday emphasizes that the most radical measures of trade union action will not be taken until all possibilities of negotiation have been exhausted.

For this reason, the trade union confederation again emphasized yesterday that the process of reindustrialization is feasible only if there is agreement on it and it therefore asks that the negotiating rules for the decree-law recently approved by the ministerial council be established as soon as possible and before the decree-law is ratified by parliament.

Similarly, the UGT asks that, within the shortest possible time, the government reveal the part of the decree dealing with such aspects as funds to create jobs and the treatment that excess workers will receive. As it has previously done in the negotiating process, the UGT maintains that reconversion must be carried out without necessarily having recourse to the rescission of contracts.

Apart from the protests that will follow upon publication of plans for the specific sectors that will be affected by reconversion, the first demonstration against the policy of reconversion will be held on 13 December in the Basque Country, one of the regions most affected by the procedures that such sectors as the naval, steel, domestic electric appliances and special steels will have to follow.

Representatives of the confederation yesterday made it clear that this sort of gathering is more political than economic, given that the date for elections to the Basque parliament is already at hand.

To these political and trade union criticisms must be added those made by business, which continue to be heard despite the fact that some of the duties envisaged for companies involved in reconversion have been cut back in a way that is accepted as more reassuring.

These criticisms focus on the possibility that giving effect to the decree-law on reconversion will introduce dangerous trends of unfair competition, which will only result in harming those enterprises not subject to the reconversion process, which can get money at lower cost than companies that, owing to their weak condition, do not come under the decree.

Another point of criticism in this regard is that motivated by the wording of article 14, which eliminates restrictive practices of competition to attain the effects of reconversion.

It is envisaged that this decree-law, which later will be processed as a draft law, will be approved during the plenary session of the Congress of Deputies that begins on 20 December.

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## WITH ELECTION COMING IN 1985, PALME PRESSURED ON UNEMPLOYMENT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Dec 83 p 14

[Article by Bo A. Ericsson]

[Text] The year 1983 was one of record high unemployment. Hopefully 1984 will be the year of recovery.

But how strong will that recovery be? How many new jobs are really needed today to bring the labor market back in balance--and what can realistically be expected?

Open unemployment will decline next year. But in spite of better times, the reduction will probably be no larger than 10-20,000 from an average level during the last half year of around 160,000 or almost 4 percent.

It would take a total of at least 100,000 new jobs today to push unemployment down to 2 percent and reduce the large number of AMS [National Labor Market Board] measures to more "normal" proportions.

Those are some of the main features of the picture of the future that is currently indicated for the labor market in 1984. It is more hopeful than it has been for several years--but it also indicates that the road back to employment will be painfully long as well as uncertain. It is likely that the goal of 100,000 new jobs cannot be achieved for several years.

Briefly, the starting situation looks like this:

The year 1983 was the hardest one the Swedish labor market has seen since World War II. Never since then have such high jobless figures been noted, never have young people, for example, had such difficulty finding jobs and never has it been necessary to use such extensive AMS measures--emergency work, etc. In this last respect, it looks as if the ceiling has now been reached and perhaps even exceeded.

At the same time 1983 was a year of change in several ways. Trends were broken, patterns started to change. Here are some of the developments--some of which will also characterize 1984.

## Social Problems

In step with the rising unemployment, increasingly difficult social problems arose: periods of joblessness became longer, especially for older workers, benefits paid by unemployment funds were used up to a large extent and ate up the social funds of many municipalities, early retirement increased even more, many older people felt almost forced to make room for younger workers.

The so-called frequency of gainful employment for the youngest groups in particular began to decline--in other words, a number of young people left the rigorous job market, possibly for educational reasons, follow-up programs in school or the like.

It became increasingly clear that parts of the educational system are out of proportion with respect to demand on the job market. This applies to such jobs as dentistry, pre-school teaching, social science and, it is feared, perhaps shorter economic courses as well. On the technical side, however, there are some shortages.

## Service

AMS changed course. Under its new general director, Allan Larsson, they are now trying to tie the measures more closely to economic policy, using the private business sector's expansion capacity as more of a basis. With "service" as the catchword--just like Jan Carlzon of SAS--there will be more concentration on finding jobs and on education, contacts with businesses will be increased, the bureaucracy will be purged and the decentralization that former AMS chief Bertil Rehnberg began will continue.

The intensive West European debate on shortening work hours in order to take care of jobs really took hold and even had some impact in Sweden too. In the government's employment package from late autumn there were several things that indicated new ways of thinking: the proposal concerning the so-called youth law in its original form (4-hour jobs, in practice a kind of division of jobs) and the appeal to state employers to look positively at more part-time jobs (thereby opening the gates for new recruitment).

## LO Criticism

At the same time, union organizations demanded better conditions for part-time retirees and the Liberal Party proposed a temporary reduction in the retirement age. Both can be seen as job policy measures in a tight situation.

But while the debate on shorter work hours took off, the opposite development took place out on the job: the steady increase over many years in the number of part-time workers was suddenly broken and turned into a decline. To maintain our standard, we have now started to increase the average hours worked. That is something new.

Politically, the rising unemployment during the year led to sharp criticism of the government within the Social Democratic Party. Especially in LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] circles where the government was accused of doing too little about jobs.

#### Mild Opposition

The opposition, on the other hand, has been remarkably soft-spoken on the issue of employment. In the partisan debate, jobs have been almost totally overshadowed by the fight against wage-earner funds, fraud and diverse affairs.

The contrast to the period before the fall of 1982, when the nonsocialists were in the government, is striking. The seat of Labor Minister Ingemar Eliasson (Liberal) was much hotter than that of his successor, Anna-Greta Leijon today, despite the fact that unemployment is actually higher now.

"No, we have not pursued the issue of unemployment with enough intensity since the government shift," said Eliasson. "We must make a better effort now."

But even though unemployment is still higher than it was at the same time last year there are obvious bright spots in prospect as 1983 gives way to 1984.

The national economy has improved with increased exports, the regaining of market shares and a more favorable trade balance.

The result of this has been that available jobs in industry have started to increase in number and layoff notices have declined.

#### Better Times

But the better times have not yet had any definitive impact on the job market. And when this does happen, it is unclear how much of an impact will be involved.

Decisive factors will be how strong a market upturn develops, what happens abroad, how large the cost increases resulting from contract negotiations will be for employers and what effects the most important elements in the government's employment package will have, i.e. the youth law and recruitment openings (the latter means that firms employing people referred by job referral offices will have half those salaries reimbursed for 6 months).

In other words there are a lot of "ifs" in the picture.

If averse effects on the points mentioned above can be avoided, the following is a likely scenario for the job market next year:

Industrial jobs will increase by 15-20,000 (after several years of sharp declines). The new jobs will be found primarily in smaller and medium-sized companies.

#### Geographic Differences

There will be more shortages, especially of qualified technicians and professional people in industry.

The development will probably not be even across the entire country. Already today there are growing differences between different regions--for example in Jonkoping County the number of job openings is now relatively much higher than in most other counties compared to the number of those seeking work. Therefore an increasing geographic and professional mobility will be needed.

In the group of private services, the number of jobs will increase by 15-20,000.

On the public side, on the other hand--the sector that used to provide so many new jobs--there is unlikely to be any increase in the number of permanent jobs as the savings program has increased impact.

In the building trades, product sales and possibly communications as well, AMS believes that there will be fewer jobs.

At the same time the number of job seekers is expected to increase by 25-30,000, especially among women and young people.

The cumulative effect of this will be to reduce unemployment. Perhaps by 20,000 if all goes well in the view of AMS. By 10-15,000 they estimate in TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees]. Probably not more than 5,000 in LO's opinion.

Employers also expect an improvement. But they do question the effect of the so-called recruitment openings.

The government has talked of 40,000 of these jobs in the private business sector by next summer. People in SAF [Swedish Employers' Confederation] say they cannot guarantee that at all. Much depends on whether these openings can be used as trial employment opportunities.

Another important change will stand out next year: municipalities will have increased responsibility for job policy measures.

#### 1984 Decisive

They are already responsible for 16-17-year olds through the schools. Now through the youth law they will have the major part of the responsibility for 18-19-year olds too.

At the same time several local solutions will probably occur--along the lines of the so-called Orebro model (special emphasis on the entire group of young people).

That is a broad outline of how 1984 could develop. In general, competition for jobs will continue to be intense.

For the government, what happens in the job sector next year will be of decisive importance. Today over half a million people are either wholly or partially outside the open regular job market--a clear improvement must come. As we move toward the 1985 election, jobs are almost the only things that count among the broad mass of Social Democrats.

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## EXPORTS TO CHINA ALMOST DOUBLE FROM 1982 TO 1983

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Dec 83 p 8

[Article by Bjorn Anders Olsson]

[Text] Sweden's exports to China will more than double this year compared to last year. China is also one of the fastest-growing Swedish markets.

So far this year, exports to China have risen 157 percent to 583 million kronor. (Only exports to Iran grew more rapidly.) But despite the rapid growth, China is still a small Swedish export market.

"However the sharp increase indicates that China has ambitions with regard to increasing its foreign trade," Per-Olof Lansing of the Export Council said.

"Other western countries are also increasing their exports to China, but the increase is especially striking for Sweden."

Per-Olof Lansing thinks Sweden will have increased its share of the Chinese market from just under 0.5 percent to almost 1 percent very soon.

Last year, Swedish exports to China were worth 375 million kronor. This year it is estimated at between 700 and 800 million kronor.

Pulp and engineering products are the dominant items, the latter through such firms as Alfa Laval, Atlas Copco, PLM [Sheetmetal Manufacturing Co], Sund's Defibrillator, and others. Steel exports have also grown.

This year Sweden will have a surplus in its trade with China. Exports are growing, while imports from that country have stagnated. So far this year imports have increased by 17 percent to 460 million kronor.

"This means a volume reduction," said Per-Olof Lansing. "Higher Chinese prices, the Swedish devaluation and the high rate of the dollar are all factors. In addition China has had problems with some deliveries. (Swedish imports include food products and textiles, among other things.)"

At the beginning of January, a new Chinese delegation will come here to increase trade contacts. It will be headed by the deputy mayor of China's biggest city, Shanghai, and will mainly study the food products, packaging and drug industries as well as telecommunications.

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## DANISH-GREENLANDIC RESOURCES COMMISSION REJECTS DRILLING BID

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Dec 83 Sect III p 3

[Text] The joint Danish-Greenlandic commission concerned with mineral raw materials in Greenland has turned down a report by the Nordisk Mineselskab and its American partner, the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), for permission to initiate a regular search for oil in Jamesonland in East Greenland next year.

The decision was reached at a meeting in Barrow, in the northern part of Alaska, where the joint commission was simultaneously studying conditions in the North American continent's largest oil fields, which ARCO has been developing in recent years.

On the other hand, the two companies got permission to continue some smaller, introductory studies of fields in the area they are interested in in Jamesonland this summer. However, the joint commission did not believe that the environmental and navigational conditions have been sufficiently clarified to make it possible to arrive at a decision to go to work on the much more extensive prospecting program with seismic investigations, among other things, which is expected to call for the investment of between half a billion and a billion kroner over a period of six years.

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## ENERGY CONSUMPTION INCREASES SLIGHTLY OVER PRECEDING YEAR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Dec 83 p 42

[Text] The total consumption of energy has shown a mild upswing during the first 3 quarters of the year and the total consumption of energy for January-September seems to have increased by about 1 percent as compared to the same time period of last year.

When it is taken into account that it has been warmer on the average this year than last year during January-September, the actual growth in energy consumption amounts to 1-2 percent according to the energy review of the Energy Division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

The total energy consumption for January-September was a total of 18.1 million equivalent oil tons. The electricity consumption has increased exceptionally fast. During the first 3 quarters of the year it was about 5 percent more than a year ago. The electricity consumption in January-September was 32.1 billion kilowatt hours.

The share of the domestic energy in the total energy consumption increased in the beginning of the year by 32 percent or 5.8 billion equivalent tons. Out of this the share of water power was 2.58 million, peat 0.50 million, and other domestic sources 2.8 million equivalent tons.

The share of imported energy in the total consumption was 12.23 million equivalent tons, of which the share of oil was 6.57, earth gas 0.39, coal 1.45, nuclear power 3.04 and imported electricity 0.78 million tons.

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## SWEDEN TO JOIN ANTARCTICA PACT, HOPES TO GAIN RESOURCES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Dec 83 p 28

[Article by Morten Fyhn: "Sweden Enters Fight for Polar Resources"]

[Text] Stockholm, 30 November. Sweden has now in earnest taken a look at the great future opportunities found in the polar areas. The country wishes to join the Antarctic Pact, while at the same time Swedish polar research is to be strengthened and better organized. This will mean expanded research cooperation with, among others, Norway.

On Wednesday, the Antarctic was discussed in the UN Political Committee, at which time Sweden's UN Ambassador announced his country's intention to join the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. Sweden will also join the Convention of 1980 concerning preservation of the living ocean resources of the Antarctic, the so-called Krill Convention. Krill is a shrimp-like fish, in whose exploitation several countries have shown interest.

According to Bo Johnson Theutenberg, international law expert of the Swedish foreign ministry, developments closest to Sweden, the Arctic, is of primary interest, referring to future resources exploitation, i.e. oil and gas exploitation. Further, he alludes to environmental effects in the area, to international law developments, and, not least, to industrial deliveries and cooperation possibilities as regards off-shore activities of various kinds.

Sweden wishes to cooperate with several countries in the polar areas, and has received clear signals from Norway concerning the desirability of a broad joint research effort. Today, Sweden's problem is that it has no coordinating research organ for the polar areas. Swedish research contribution in these areas is sporadic and without continuity. This, too has made regular cooperation with other countries difficult.

According to Johnson Theutenberg the Swedish government will appreciate better coordination of polar research. Earlier, the Swedes have pointed to the need for an organ patterned on the Norwegian Polar Institute.

On Wednesday, Odd Rogne, director of the Institute was in Stockholm to discuss polar research with, among others, Johnson Theutenberg. Rogne says to AFTENPOSTEN that it is of value that Sweden now wishes to join the



Antarctic Treaty. He calls attention to the fact that some countries are now working to have the Antarctica Treaty administered by the UN and for the Antarctic Treaty to be included in such an administration. Rogne therefore finds it advantageous that as many countries as possible support the system encompassed in treaty cooperation.

"Nevertheless," says Rogne, "to be accepted as a full member of the Treaty, Sweden must make a considerable research effort." Johnson Theutenberg says in response that for the time being Sweden is not aiming at full membership.

It costs nothing to subscribe to the treaty, but at the same time it is an expression of Swedish support of an international treaty which according to Johnson Theutenberg is one of the more successful cases of international law.

He also emphasizes another reason for active Swedish participation in the polar areas. An increasing number of countries have their attention directed toward these areas. They are of international political importance as well, which was brought to mind during the Falkland war, he says. Bo Johnson Theutenberg asserts that Sweden intends primarily to engage in research and recalls that Sweden has good traditions in the Arctic. Cooperation with Norway is desirable. Director Rogne of the Polar Institute says that from the Norwegian point of view it must involve Sweden establishing a research budget and an organization to handle polar research. Thus far, Norway has engaged in fruitful research cooperation with individual Swedish scientists. It should now be possible to establish long term cooperation, says Rogne.

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